Detection rules › Splunk

Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
Arguments, Author, Command, Enabled, Hidden, dest, task_name
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks in Windows that use the rundll32 command. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, which logs the creation of scheduled tasks, and filters for tasks executed via rundll32. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malware, such as TrickBot, to persist in an environment or deliver additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
ExecutionT1053 Scheduled Task/Job
PersistenceT1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Privilege EscalationT1053 Scheduled Task/Job

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
Security-AuditingEvent ID 4698A scheduled task was created.

Rule body splunk

name: Schedule Task with Rundll32 Command Trigger
id: 75b00fd8-a0ff-11eb-8b31-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-04-26'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of scheduled tasks in Windows that use the rundll32 command. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, which logs the creation of scheduled tasks, and filters for tasks executed via rundll32. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by malware, such as TrickBot, to persist in an environment or deliver additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Immediate investigation and mitigation are crucial to prevent further compromise.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4698
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698
      | xmlkv Message
      | search Command IN ("*rundll32*")
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest, Task_Name, Command,
           Author, Enabled, Hidden,
           Arguments
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the task schedule (Exa. Security Log EventCode 4698) endpoints. Tune and filter known instances of Task schedule used in your environment.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://labs.vipre.com/trickbot-and-its-modules/
    - https://whitehat.eu/incident-response-case-study-featuring-ryuk-and-trickbot-part-2/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A scheduled task process commandline rundll32 arguments $Arguments$ on host $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Living Off The Land
    - IcedID
    - Scheduled Tasks
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Trickbot
    - Castle RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/trickbot/tasksched/windows-security.log
          source: WinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: WinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4698

Stage 2: xmlkv

| xmlkv Message

Stage 3: search

| search Command IN ("*rundll32*")

Stage 4: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY dest, Task_Name, Command,
       Author, Enabled, Hidden,
       Arguments

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 7: search

| `schedule_task_with_rundll32_command_trigger_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
Commandin
  • "*rundll32*"
EventCodeeq
  • 4698 corpus 14 (splunk 14)