Detection rules › Splunk

Schtasks used for forcing a reboot

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Bhavin Patel, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to schedule forced system reboots using the 'shutdown' and '/create' flags. It leverages endpoint process data to identify instances where these specific command-line arguments are used. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary attempting to disrupt operations or force a reboot to execute further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, potential data loss, and provide an attacker with an opportunity to execute additional payloads or evade detection.

Known false positives

  • This analytic may also capture legitimate administrative activities such as system updates or maintenance tasks, which can be classified as false positives. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Schtasks used for forcing a reboot
id: 1297fb80-f42a-4b4a-9c8a-88c066437cf6
version: 15
creation_date: '2020-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of 'schtasks.exe' to schedule forced system reboots using the 'shutdown' and '/create' flags. It leverages endpoint process data to identify instances where these specific command-line arguments are used. This activity is significant because it may indicate an adversary attempting to disrupt operations or force a reboot to execute further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to system downtime, potential data loss, and provide an attacker with an opportunity to execute additional payloads or evade detection.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create *"
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: This analytic may also capture legitimate administrative activities such as system updates or maintenance tasks, which can be classified as false positives. Filter as needed.
references: []
finding:
    title: A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A schedule task process $process_name$ with force reboot commandline $process$ in host $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Ransomware
    - Scheduled Tasks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
  WHERE Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe Processes.process="*shutdown*" Processes.process="*/create *"
  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `schtasks_used_for_forcing_a_reboot_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.processeq
  • "*/create *" corpus 5 (sigma 3, splunk 2)
  • "*shutdown*" corpus 4 (splunk 4)
field:"CommandLine" kind:eq
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "schtasks.exe" corpus 30 (elastic 19, splunk 11)
field:"process_name" kind:eq