Detection rules › Splunk
Screensaver Event Trigger Execution
The following analytic detects modifications to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry entry, indicating potential event trigger execution via screensaver settings for persistence or privilege escalation. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by APT groups and malware to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistent access.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1546.002 Event Triggered Execution: Screensaver |
| Privilege Escalation | T1546.002 Event Triggered Execution: Screensaver |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13 | RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body splunk
name: Screensaver Event Trigger Execution
id: 58cea3ec-1f6d-11ec-8560-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-09-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects modifications to the SCRNSAVE.EXE registry entry, indicating potential event trigger execution via screensaver settings for persistence or privilege escalation. It leverages registry activity data from the Endpoint data model to identify changes to the specified registry path. This activity is significant as it is a known technique used by APT groups and malware to maintain persistence or escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistent access.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/002/
- https://dmcxblue.gitbook.io/red-team-notes-2-0/red-team-techniques/privilege-escalation/untitled-3/screensaver
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted on $dest$.
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: Registry path $registry_path$ was modified, added, or deleted on $dest$.
analytic_story:
- Hermetic Wiper
- Windows Privilege Escalation
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Data Destruction
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1546.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1546.002/scrnsave_reg/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path="*\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\SCRNSAVE.EXE*") by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
Stage 5: search
| `screensaver_event_trigger_execution_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Registry.registry_path | eq |
|