ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell

name: ServicePrincipalNames Discovery with PowerShell
id: 13243068-2d38-11ec-8908-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-10-15'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of `powershell.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs) using Script Block Logging EventCode 4104. It identifies the use of the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class within the script block, which is equivalent to using setspn.exe. This activity is significant as it often precedes kerberoasting or silver ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this information to escalate privileges or persist within the environment.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*KerberosRequestorSecurityToken*"
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `serviceprincipalnames_discovery_with_powershell_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: False positives should be limited, however filter as needed.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ad/service-principal-names
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/setspn.exe-5C184D581524245DAD7A0A02B51FD2C2.html
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
    - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/717.service-principal-names-spn-setspn-syntax.aspx
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20220212163642/https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/
    - https://blog.zsec.uk/paving-2-da-wholeset/
    - https://msitpros.com/?p=3113
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466
    - https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
    - https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
    - https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
finding:
    title: An instance of attempting to identify service principle detected on $dest$ names.
    entity:
        field: user_id
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of attempting to identify service principle detected on $dest$ names.
analytic_story:
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - Active Directory Discovery
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Malicious PowerShell
    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1558.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint