Detection rules › Splunk
Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn
The following analytic identifies services.exe spawning a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where services.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse the Service Control Manager to execute malicious code via native Windows binaries, facilitating lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
| Privilege Escalation | T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn
id: ba9e1954-4c04-11ec-8b74-3e22fbd008af
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-11-23'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies `services.exe` spawning a LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts) execution process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where `services.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse the Service Control Manager to execute malicious code via native Windows binaries, facilitating lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe
)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Legitimate applications may trigger this behavior, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2020/07/21/lateral-movement-services/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: "Services.exe spawned LOLBAS: $process_name$ located in $process_path$ on $dest$"
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: process
type: process
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Living Off The Land
- Qakbot
- CISA AA23-347A
- Hellcat Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1543.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/lateral_movement_lolbas/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE (
Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe
)
(Processes.process_name IN ("Regsvcs.exe", "Ftp.exe", "OfflineScannerShell.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "Dllhost.exe", "Pnputil.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Ttdinject.exe","Mshta.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "Certoc.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Bash.exe", "Hh.exe", "SettingSyncHost.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Mmc.exe", "Stordiag.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Msdt.exe", "WorkFolders.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Wuauclt.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Syncappvpublishingserver.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Explorer.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Wab.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "At.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Msconfig.exe"))
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `services_lolbas_execution_process_spawn_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.parent_process_name | eq |
|
Processes.process_name | in |
|