Detection rules › Splunk
SLUI RunAs Elevated
The following analytic detects the execution of the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (slui.exe) with elevated privileges using the -verb runas function. This activity is identified through logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry keys and command-line parameters. This behavior is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to gain elevated access and execute malicious actions with higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized system changes, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected endpoint.
Known false positives
- Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: SLUI RunAs Elevated
id: 8d124810-b3e4-11eb-96c7-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-05-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the execution of the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) with elevated privileges using the `-verb runas` function. This activity is identified through logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry keys and command-line parameters. This behavior is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to gain elevated access and execute malicious actions with higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized system changes, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected endpoint.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `slui_runas_elevated_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives should be present as this is not commonly used by legitimate applications.
references:
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998
- https://mattharr0ey.medium.com/privilege-escalation-uac-bypass-in-changepk-c40b92818d1b
- https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/0c92cd554d3156fd74f6c25660ccc466
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
finding:
title: A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ on host $dest$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A slui process $process_name$ with elevated commandline $process$ on host $dest$
analytic_story:
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Compromised Windows Host
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1548.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=slui.exe (Processes.process=*-verb* Processes.process=*runas*)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `slui_runas_elevated_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.process | eq |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:eq |
Processes.process_name | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq |