Detection rules › Splunk
SLUI Spawning a Process
The following analytic detects the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (slui.exe) spawning a child process. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where slui.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because slui.exe should not typically spawn child processes, and doing so may indicate a UAC bypass attempt, leading to elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this to execute code with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the system's security and gaining unauthorized access.
Known false positives
- Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: SLUI Spawning a Process
id: 879c4330-b3e0-11eb-b1b1-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-05-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) spawning a child process. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events where `slui.exe` is the parent process. This activity is significant because `slui.exe` should not typically spawn child processes, and doing so may indicate a UAC bypass attempt, leading to elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this to execute code with elevated privileges, potentially compromising the system's security and gaining unauthorized access.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe AND NOT Processes.process_name=slui.exe
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Certain applications may spawn from `slui.exe` that are legitimate. Filtering will be needed to ensure proper monitoring.
references:
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46998
- https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/local/bypassuac_sluihijack/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
finding:
title: A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ on host $dest$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A slui process $parent_process_name$ spawning child process $process_name$ on host $dest$
analytic_story:
- DarkSide Ransomware
- Compromised Windows Host
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1548.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.parent_process_name=slui.exe AND NOT Processes.process_name=slui.exe
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `slui_spawning_a_process_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.process_name | eq | "slui.exe" | excludes:Processes.process_name |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.parent_process_name | eq |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:eq |