Detection rules › Splunk

Stored Credentials from Web Browsers - Windows (PowerShell)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers. After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). This use case detects attempts to enumerate or access files containing stored credentials from web browsers on Windows endpoints

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '14942.22051'
title: Stored Credentials from Web Browsers - Windows
description: 'Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files
  specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website
  usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future.
  Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential
  store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
  After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle
  the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access.
  This can result in significantly furthering an adversary''s objective in cases where
  credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain
  administrator). This use case detects attempts to enumerate or access files containing
  stored credentials from web browsers on Windows endpoints. -- Threat Actor Association:
  Earth Estries, Scattered Spider (aka. Muddled Libra, Scatter Swine, Starfraud, UNC3944)
  -- Atomic T1555.003 Test #4 Atomic T1555.003 Test #5 Atomic T1555.003 Test #6 Atomic
  T1555.003 Test #7'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR
  "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") (TERM(Copy-Item) OR
  TERM(copy) OR TERM(xcopy) OR TERM(cp) OR TERM(cpi) OR TERM(robocopy)) AND ("Chrome"
  OR "Opera" OR "Firefox" OR "Edge") | regex process="(?i)(Copy\-Item|copy|xcopy|[^\-]cp|[^\-]cpi|robocopy)\s+.+?((\x5cGoogle\x5cChrome\x5cUser\sData\x5cDefault\x5cLogin\s)|(\x5cOpera.+Login\s)|(\x5cFirefox\x5cProfiles)|(\x5cEdge\x5cUser\sData\x5c))"
  | table _time, host, user signature_id, process, process_* | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- credential-access:credentials from password stores:credentials from web browsers
technique_id:
- T1555.003
data_category:
- PowerShell logs
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_powershell` (TERM(EventCode=4103) OR "<EventID>4103<" OR TERM(EventCode=4104) OR "<EventID>4104<") (TERM(Copy-Item) OR TERM(copy) OR TERM(xcopy) OR TERM(cp) OR TERM(cpi) OR TERM(robocopy)) AND ("Chrome" OR "Opera" OR "Firefox" OR "Edge")

Stage 2: regex

| regex process="(?i)(Copy\-Item|copy|xcopy|[^\-]cp|[^\-]cpi|robocopy)\s+.+?((\x5cGoogle\x5cChrome\x5cUser\sData\x5cDefault\x5cLogin\s)|(\x5cOpera.+Login\s)|(\x5cFirefox\x5cProfiles)|(\x5cEdge\x5cUser\sData\x5c))"

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user signature_id, process, process_*

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4103 corpus 105 (splunk 105)
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq
processregex_match
  • "(?i)(Copy\-Item|copy|xcopy|[^\-]cp|[^\-]cpi|robocopy)\s+.+?((\x5cGoogle\x5cChrome\x5cUser\sData\x5cDefault\x5cLogin\s)|(\x5cOpera.+Login\s)|(\x5cFirefox\x5cProfiles)|(\x5cEdge\x5cUser\sData\x5c))"
field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4103<"
1"<EventID>4104<"
1"Copy-Item"
1copy
1xcopy
1cp
1cpi
1robocopy
1"Chrome"
1"Opera"
1"Firefox"
1"Edge"