Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Certificate Authentication (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Adversaries may steal an AD CA’s root certificate, and forge a certificate for any active user or computer. This use case looks for Kerberos ticket requests with certificate thumbprints.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '8651.11135'
title: Suspicious Certificate Authentication
description: 'Adversaries may steal an AD CA’s root certificate, and forge a certificate
  for any active user or computer. This use case looks for Kerberos ticket requests
  with certificate thumbprints. '
logic_format: Splunk
logic: ' `get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4768) OR
  "<EventID>4768<") Certificate_Issuer_Name=* | eval certificate_name=Certificate_Issuer_Name
  | table _time, host, user process, process_*, parent_process, parent_process_*,
  src_*, dest_*, subject, certificate_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time,
  host '
techniques:
- persistence:modify authentication process
technique_id: 
- T1556
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4768) OR "<EventID>4768<") Certificate_Issuer_Name=*

Stage 2: eval

| eval certificate_name=Certificate_Issuer_Name

Stage 3: table

| table _time, host, user process, process_*, parent_process, parent_process_*, src_*, dest_*, subject, certificate_*

Stage 4: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 5: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4768<"