Detection rules › Splunk
Suspicious Child Process for hh.exe (Sysmon)
Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by User Execution. This use case detects hh.exe spawning suspicious child processes, including shell utilities and other native Windows utilities
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
Rule body
id: '17798.30045'
title: Suspicious Child Process for hh.exe
description: 'Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious
code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system.
A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then
triggered by User Execution. This use case detects hh.exe spawning suspicious child
processes, including shell utilities and other native Windows utilities. -- Threat
Actor Association: APT-K-47/Mysterious Elephant -- LOLBAS Atomics T1218.001 Test
#2'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
(TERM(hh) OR "hh.exe") (TERM(cmd) OR TERM(powershell) OR TERM(pwsh) OR TERM(wscript)
OR TERM(cscript) OR TERM(regsvr32) OR TERM(wmic) OR TERM(rundll32) OR TERM(MSHTA)
OR TERM(CertUtil) OR TERM(CertReq) OR TERM(MSbuild) OR TERM(installutil) OR TERM(schtasks)
OR TERM(msiexec)) | where match(parent_process_name, "(?i)hh\.exe") and match(process_name,
"(?i)cmd|powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|regsvr32|wmic|rundll32|MSHTA|CertUtil|CertReq|MSbuild|installutil|schtasks|msiexec")
| table _time, host, user process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s | stats
values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:system binary proxy execution:compiled html file
technique_id:
- T1218.001
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.001/T1218.001.md#atomic-test-2---compiled-html-help-remote-payload
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") (TERM(hh) OR "hh.exe") (TERM(cmd) OR TERM(powershell) OR TERM(pwsh) OR TERM(wscript) OR TERM(cscript) OR TERM(regsvr32) OR TERM(wmic) OR TERM(rundll32) OR TERM(MSHTA) OR TERM(CertUtil) OR TERM(CertReq) OR TERM(MSbuild) OR TERM(installutil) OR TERM(schtasks) OR TERM(msiexec))
Stage 2: where
| where match(parent_process_name, "(?i)hh\.exe") and match(process_name, "(?i)cmd|powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|regsvr32|wmic|rundll32|MSHTA|CertUtil|CertReq|MSbuild|installutil|schtasks|msiexec")
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user process, process_*, parent_process_*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1" |
parent_process_name | regex_match |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match |
process_name | regex_match |
| field:"process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>1<" |
| 1 | hh |
| 1 | "hh.exe" |
| 1 | cmd |
| 1 | powershell |
| 1 | pwsh |
| 1 | wscript |
| 1 | cscript |
| 1 | regsvr32 |
| 1 | wmic |
| 1 | rundll32 |
| 1 | MSHTA |
| 1 | CertUtil |
| 1 | CertReq |
| 1 | MSbuild |
| 1 | installutil |
| 1 | schtasks |
| 1 | msiexec |