Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious ComputerDefaults.exe Execution (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

computerdefaults.exe is a legitimate Windows executable handling the Default Programs feature in Windows. This feature allows users to set default programs for specific tasks such as web browsing, email, and media playback. Threat actors may modify the registry to have computerdefaults.exe run arbitrary commands when executed, potentially leading to UAC bypass. This use case detects high or system integrity-level executions of ComputerDefaults.exe that are not initiated from Windows\System32 or Program Files directories

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: '33164.58810'
title: Suspicious ComputerDefaults.exe Execution
description: 'computerdefaults.exe is a legitimate Windows executable handling the
  Default Programs feature in Windows. This feature allows users to set default programs
  for specific tasks such as web browsing, email, and media playback. Threat actors
  may modify the registry to have computerdefaults.exe run arbitrary commands when
  executed, potentially leading to UAC bypass. This use case detects high or system
  integrity-level executions of ComputerDefaults.exe that are not initiated from Windows\System32
  or Program Files directories. Atomics T1548.002 Test #5 Living Off the Land Binary
  and Scripts (LOLBAS) (LOLBIN)'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TokenElevationType="%%1937" "ComputerDefaults.exe"
  | regex parent_process_path!="(?i):\x5c(Windows\x5cSystem32|Program\sFiles)"| regex
  process_path="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5cComputerDefaults\.exe" | table _time,
  host, user ObjectName, process, process_*, parent_process_name | bin span=1s | stats
  values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- privilege-escalation:abuse elevation control mechanism:bypass user account control
technique_id:
- T1548.002
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_computerdefaults.yml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) TokenElevationType="%%1937" "ComputerDefaults.exe"

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_path!="(?i):\x5c(Windows\x5cSystem32|Program\sFiles)"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path="(?i):\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5cComputerDefaults\.exe"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user ObjectName, process, process_*, parent_process_name

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
parent_process_pathregex_match"(?i):\x5c(Windows\x5cSystem32|Program\sFiles)"excludes:parent_process_path

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688"
TokenElevationTypeeq
  • "%%1937"
field:"TokenElevationType" kind:eq
process_pathregex_match
  • "(?i):\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5cComputerDefaults.exe"
field:"process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>4688<"
1"ComputerDefaults.exe"