Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Confluence Child Process - Windows (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may target vulnerabilities in Confluence to gain initial access and then spawn command-line utilities from Confluence processes. This allows them to download malicious payloads or execute arbitrary commands on the compromised system, potentially leading to full system control or further lateral movement within the network. This use case detects when Confluence processes launch command-line utilities, potentially indicating that a threat actor has gained initial access through Confluence vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-22527 or CVE-2023-22518. Note: logging of the full parent process file path is required for detection.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '38368.69010'
title: Suspicious Confluence Child Process - Windows
description: 'Threat actors may target vulnerabilities in Confluence to gain initial
  access and then spawn command-line utilities from Confluence processes. This allows
  them to download malicious payloads or execute arbitrary commands on the compromised
  system, potentially leading to full system control or further lateral movement within
  the network. This use case detects when Confluence processes launch command-line
  utilities, potentially indicating that a threat actor has gained initial access
  through Confluence vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-22527 or CVE-2023-22518. Note:
  logging of the full parent process file path is required for detection.'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  "Confluence" ("tomcat" OR "java.exe") ("pwsh.exe" OR "powershell.exe" OR "cmd.exe"
  OR "curl.exe" OR "wget.exe" OR "certutil.exe" OR "bitsadmin.exe" OR "mshta.exe"
  OR "regsvr32.exe") | regex parent_process_path="(?i)Confluence.*(tomcat\d+?|java)\.exe"|
  regex process_path="(?i)(pwsh|powershell|cmd|curl|wget|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|regsvr32)\.exe"
  | table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s |
  stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- initial-access:exploit public-facing application
technique_id: 
- T1190
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://github.com/ForceFledgling/CVE-2023-22518
- https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176789/Atlassian-Confluence-SSTI-Injection.html
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/confluence-to-cerber-exploitation-of-cve-2023-22518-for-ransomware-deployment

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") "Confluence" ("tomcat" OR "java.exe") ("pwsh.exe" OR "powershell.exe" OR "cmd.exe" OR "curl.exe" OR "wget.exe" OR "certutil.exe" OR "bitsadmin.exe" OR "mshta.exe" OR "regsvr32.exe")

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_path="(?i)Confluence.*(tomcat\d+?|java)\.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path="(?i)(pwsh|powershell|cmd|curl|wget|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|regsvr32)\.exe"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
parent_process_pathregex_match
  • "(?i)Confluence.*(tomcat\d+?|java).exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match
process_pathregex_match
  • "(?i)(pwsh|powershell|cmd|curl|wget|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|regsvr32).exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1"Confluence"
1"tomcat"
1"java.exe"
1"pwsh.exe"
1"powershell.exe"
1"cmd.exe"
1"curl.exe"
1"wget.exe"
1"certutil.exe"
1"bitsadmin.exe"
1"mshta.exe"
1"regsvr32.exe"