Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Confluence Child Process - Windows (Windows Event Log)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may target vulnerabilities in Confluence to gain initial access and then spawn command-line utilities from Confluence processes. This allows them to download malicious payloads or execute arbitrary commands on the compromised system, potentially leading to full system control or further lateral movement within the network. This use case detects when Confluence processes launch command-line utilities, potentially indicating that a threat actor has gained initial access through Confluence vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-22527 or CVE-2023-22518. Note: logging of the full parent process file path is required for detection.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial AccessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

id: '38368.68996'
title: Suspicious Confluence Child Process - Windows
description: 'Threat actors may target vulnerabilities in Confluence to gain initial
  access and then spawn command-line utilities from Confluence processes. This allows
  them to download malicious payloads or execute arbitrary commands on the compromised
  system, potentially leading to full system control or further lateral movement within
  the network. This use case detects when Confluence processes launch command-line
  utilities, potentially indicating that a threat actor has gained initial access
  through Confluence vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-22527 or CVE-2023-22518. Note:
  logging of the full parent process file path is required for detection.'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
  "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "Confluence" ("tomcat" OR "java.exe") ("pwsh.exe"
  OR "powershell.exe" OR "cmd.exe" OR "curl.exe" OR "wget.exe" OR "certutil.exe" OR
  "bitsadmin.exe" OR "mshta.exe" OR "regsvr32.exe") | regex parent_process_path="(?i)Confluence.*(tomcat\d+?|java)\.exe"|
  regex process_path="(?i)(pwsh|powershell|cmd|curl|wget|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|regsvr32)\.exe"
  | table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_* | bin span=1s |
  stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- initial-access:exploit public-facing application
technique_id: 
- T1190
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://github.com/ForceFledgling/CVE-2023-22518
- https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176789/Atlassian-Confluence-SSTI-Injection.html
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/confluence-to-cerber-exploitation-of-cve-2023-22518-for-ransomware-deployment

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) "Confluence" ("tomcat" OR "java.exe") ("pwsh.exe" OR "powershell.exe" OR "cmd.exe" OR "curl.exe" OR "wget.exe" OR "certutil.exe" OR "bitsadmin.exe" OR "mshta.exe" OR "regsvr32.exe")

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_path="(?i)Confluence.*(tomcat\d+?|java)\.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path="(?i)(pwsh|powershell|cmd|curl|wget|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|regsvr32)\.exe"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_process_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4688 corpus 313 (splunk 283, kusto 30)
parent_process_pathregex_match
  • "(?i)Confluence.*(tomcat\d+?|java).exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
process_pathregex_match
  • "(?i)(pwsh|powershell|cmd|curl|wget|certutil|bitsadmin|mshta|regsvr32).exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1TERM
1"<EventID>4688<"
1"Confluence"
1"tomcat"
1"java.exe"
1"pwsh.exe"
1"powershell.exe"
1"cmd.exe"
1"curl.exe"
1"wget.exe"
1"certutil.exe"
1"bitsadmin.exe"
1"mshta.exe"
1"regsvr32.exe"