Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request

Status
production
Severity
medium
Author
Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests where the requesting account name matches the service name, potentially indicating an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. This detection leverages Event ID 4769 from Domain Controller and Kerberos events. Such activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to escalate privileges by impersonating a domain controller. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to take control of the domain controller, leading to complete domain compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket Request
id: 8b1297bc-6204-11ec-b7c4-acde48001122
version: 12
creation_date: '2021-12-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests where the requesting account name matches the service name, potentially indicating an exploitation attempt of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. This detection leverages Event ID 4769 from Domain Controller and Kerberos events. Such activity is significant as it may represent an adversary attempting to escalate privileges by impersonating a domain controller. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to take control of the domain controller, leading to complete domain compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4769
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769
      | eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,"@"),0)),1,0)
      | where isSuspicious = 1
      | rename Computer as dest
      | rename TargetUserName as user
      | table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious
      | `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: We have tested this detection logic with ~2 million 4769 events and did not identify false positives. However, they may be possible in certain environments. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/02636893-7a1f-4357-af9a-b672e3e3de13
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A suspicious Kerberos Service Ticket was requested by $user$ on host $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2021-42287
    - CVE-2021-42278
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1078.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4769

Stage 2: eval

| eval isSuspicious = if(lower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(split(TargetUserName,"@"),0)),1,0)
isSuspicious =
iflower(ServiceName) = lower(mvindex(<FUNCTION:split>, 0))1
else0

Stage 3: where

| where isSuspicious = 1

Stage 4: rename

| rename Computer as dest

Stage 5: rename

| rename TargetUserName as user

Stage 6: table

| table _time, dest, src_ip, user, ServiceName, Error_Code, isSuspicious

Stage 7: search

| `suspicious_kerberos_service_ticket_request_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4769 corpus 10 (splunk 6, kusto 4)
isSuspiciouseq
  • 1