Detection rules › Splunk
Suspicious Process Executed From Container File
The following analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Known false positives
- Various business process or userland applications and behavior.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1: Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
name: Suspicious Process Executed From Container File
id: d8120352-3b62-411c-8cb6-7b47584dd5e8
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-07-11'
modification_date: '2026-07-09'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count
min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process IN (
"*.ZIP\\*",
"*.ISO\\*",
"*.IMG\\*",
"*.CAB\\*",
"*.TAR\\*",
"*.GZ\\*",
"*.RAR\\*",
"*.7Z\\*"
)
AND Processes.action="allowed"
by
Processes.action
Processes.dest
Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process
Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path
Processes.user
Processes.user_id
Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| regex process="(?i).*\.(zip|iso|img|cab|tar|gz|rar|7z)\\\\.+\.(bat|bin|cab|cmd|com|cpl|ex_|exe|gadget|inf1|ins|inx|htm|html|isu|jar|job|js|jse|lnk|msc|msi|msp|mst|paf|pif|ps1|reg|rgs|scr|sct|shb|shs|u3p|vb|vbe|vbs|vbscript|ws|wsf|wsh)\"?$"
| rex field=process "(?i).+\\\\(?<file_name>[^\\\\]+\.(?:zip|iso|img|cab|tar|gz|rar|7z))\\\\(?:.+\\\\)?(?<container_file_name>[^\\\\\"]+\.(?:bat|bin|cab|cmd|com|cpl|ex_|exe|gadget|inf1|ins|inx|htm|html|isu|jar|job|js|jse|lnk|msc|msi|msp|mst|paf|pif|ps1|reg|rgs|scr|sct|shb|shs|u3p|vb|vbe|vbs|vbscript|ws|wsf|wsh))\"?$"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Various business process or userland applications and behavior.
references:
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-evolution-gootloader-operations
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/weaponizing-disk-image-files-analysis/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
finding:
title: A suspicious file [$container_file_name$] was launched from container file [$file_name$] by process [$process_name$] on [$dest$].
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: A suspicious file [$container_file_name$] was launched from container file [$file_name$] by process [$process_name$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
- field: file_name
type: file_name
- field: container_file_name
type: file_name
analytic_story:
- APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
- GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
- Unusual Processes
- Amadey
- Remcos
- Snake Keylogger
- Water Gamayun
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1204.002
- T1036.008
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count
min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process IN (
"*.ZIP\\*",
"*.ISO\\*",
"*.IMG\\*",
"*.CAB\\*",
"*.TAR\\*",
"*.GZ\\*",
"*.RAR\\*",
"*.7Z\\*"
)
AND Processes.action="allowed"
by
Processes.action
Processes.dest
Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process
Processes.process_exec
Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path
Processes.user
Processes.user_id
Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: regex
| regex process="(?i).*\.(zip|iso|img|cab|tar|gz|rar|7z)\\\\.+\.(bat|bin|cab|cmd|com|cpl|ex_|exe|gadget|inf1|ins|inx|htm|html|isu|jar|job|js|jse|lnk|msc|msi|msp|mst|paf|pif|ps1|reg|rgs|scr|sct|shb|shs|u3p|vb|vbe|vbs|vbscript|ws|wsf|wsh)\"?$"
Stage 4: rex
| rex field=process "(?i).+\\\\(?<file_name>[^\\\\]+\.(?:zip|iso|img|cab|tar|gz|rar|7z))\\\\(?:.+\\\\)?(?<container_file_name>[^\\\\\"]+\.(?:bat|bin|cab|cmd|com|cpl|ex_|exe|gadget|inf1|ins|inx|htm|html|isu|jar|job|js|jse|lnk|msc|msi|msp|mst|paf|pif|ps1|reg|rgs|scr|sct|shb|shs|u3p|vb|vbe|vbs|vbscript|ws|wsf|wsh))\"?$"
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Processes.action | eq |
| field:"event_action" kind:eq |
Processes.process | in |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:in |
process | regex_match |
| field:"CommandLine" kind:regex_match |