Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
QueryName, QueryResults, QueryStatus, answer, answer_count, dvc, process_guid, process_name, query, query_count, reply_code_id, signature, signature_id, src, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing "discord" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.

Known false positives

  • Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 22: DNSEvent (DNS query)

Rule body

name: Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query
id: 4d4332ae-792c-11ec-89c1-acde48001122
version: 14
creation_date: '2022-01-19'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing "discord" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 22
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by answer answer_count dvc process_exec process_guid process_name query query_count reply_code_id signature signature_id src user_id vendor_product QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`'
how_to_implement: his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.
known_false_positives: Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
    - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dvc
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dvc$
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Data Destruction
    - WhisperGate
    - PXA Stealer
    - Cactus Ransomware
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
    - Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1059.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: network
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe"

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by answer answer_count dvc process_exec process_guid process_name query query_count reply_code_id signature signature_id src user_id vendor_product QueryName QueryResults QueryStatus

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 22 corpus 17 (splunk 17)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"22"
Imagene
  • "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*"
  • "*\\Program Files*"
  • "discord.exe"
field:"Image" kind:ne
QueryNamein
  • "*discord*"
field:"QueryName" kind:in