Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the use of Regsvr32.exe to register DLLs from suspicious paths such as AppData, ProgramData, or Windows Temp directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe can be abused to proxy execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.

Known false positives

  • Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Suspicious Regsvr32 Register Suspicious Path
id: 62732736-6250-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 18
creation_date: '2021-01-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of Regsvr32.exe to register DLLs from suspicious paths such as AppData, ProgramData, or Windows Temp directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe can be abused to proxy execution of malicious code, bypassing traditional security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\programdata\\*","*\\windows\\temp\\*") NOT (Processes.process IN ("*.dll*", "*.ax*", "*.ocx*")) by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Limited false positives with the query restricted to specified paths. Add more world writeable paths as tuning continues.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.010/T1218.010.md
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/
    - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-use-the-regsvr32-tool-and-troubleshoot-regsvr32-error-messages-a98d960a-7392-e6fe-d90a-3f4e0cb543e5
    - https://any.run/report/f29a7d2ecd3585e1e4208e44bcc7156ab5388725f1d29d03e7699da0d4598e7c/0826458b-5367-45cf-b841-c95a33a01718
finding:
    title: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to evade detection by using a non-standard file extension.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to evade detection by using a non-standard file extension.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Living Off The Land
    - Qakbot
    - China-Nexus Threat Activity
    - Derusbi
    - Salt Typhoon
    - Suspicious Regsvr32 Activity
    - IcedID
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.010
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_regsvr32` Processes.process IN ("*\\appdata\\*", "*\\programdata\\*","*\\windows\\temp\\*") NOT (Processes.process IN ("*.dll*", "*.ax*", "*.ocx*")) by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `suspicious_regsvr32_register_suspicious_path_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Processes.processin"*.ax*", "*.dll*", "*.ocx*"excludes:Processes.process

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "REGSVR32.EXE" corpus 37 (sigma 17, elastic 15, splunk 5)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*\\appdata\\*" corpus 2 (chronicle 2)
  • "*\\programdata\\*"
  • "*\\windows\\temp\\*"
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "regsvr32.exe" corpus 73 (elastic 68, splunk 5)
field:"process_name" kind:eq