Detection rules › Splunk

Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without any command line arguments. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution logs. It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires command line arguments to function properly, and its absence is often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to credential dumping, unauthorized file writes, or other malicious actions.

Known false positives

  • Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Suspicious Rundll32 no Command Line Arguments
id: e451bd16-e4c5-4109-8eb1-c4c6ecf048b4
version: 15
creation_date: '2021-02-09'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe without any command line arguments.
    This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process execution logs.
    It is significant because rundll32.exe typically requires command line arguments to function properly, and its absence is often associated with malicious activities, such as those performed by Cobalt Strike.
    If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to credential dumping, unauthorized file writes, or other malicious actions.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
    
    `process_rundll32`
    Processes.process IN ("*rundll32","*rundll32.exe", "*rundll32.exe\"")
    
    BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
       Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |-
    Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of rundll32, triggering a false positive.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32/
    - https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/
finding:
    title: Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Suspicious rundll32.exe process with no command line arguments executed on $dest$ by $user$
analytic_story:
    - Suspicious Rundll32 Activity
    - Cobalt Strike
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527
    - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
    - Hellcat Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
cve:
    - CVE-2021-34527
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.011
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

`process_rundll32`
Processes.process IN ("*rundll32","*rundll32.exe", "*rundll32.exe\"")

BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
   Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
   Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
   Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `suspicious_rundll32_no_command_line_arguments_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Processes.original_file_nameeq
  • "RUNDLL32.EXE" corpus 78 (sigma 35, elastic 22, splunk 21)
field:"OriginalFileName" kind:eq
Processes.processin
  • "*rundll32"
  • "*rundll32.exe" corpus 2 (sigma 2)
  • "*rundll32.exe\""
field:"CommandLine" kind:in
Processes.process_nameeq
  • "rundll32.exe" corpus 126 (elastic 100, splunk 26)
field:"process_name" kind:eq