Detection rules › Splunk
Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request
The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It leverages Event ID 4781 (account name change) and Event ID 4768 (TGT request) to identify sequences where a newly renamed computer account requests a TGT. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain elevated access and potentially control over the domain environment.
Known false positives
- A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
name: Suspicious Ticket Granting Ticket Request
id: d77d349e-6269-11ec-9cfe-acde48001122
version: 10
creation_date: '2021-12-21'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It leverages Event ID 4781 (account name change) and Event ID 4768 (TGT request) to identify sequences where a newly renamed computer account requests a TGT. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain elevated access and potentially control over the domain environment.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4768
- Windows Event Log Security 4781
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName="*$" NewTargetUserName!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!="*$")
| eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName)
| transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768)
| eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE")
| search short_lived = TRUE
| table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived
| rename Computer as dest
| `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Domain Controller and Kerberos events. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Kerberos Authentication Service` within `Account Logon` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: A computer account name change event inmediately followed by a kerberos TGT request with matching fields is unsual. However, legitimate behavior may trigger it. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://exploit.ph/cve-2021-42287-cve-2021-42278-weaponisation.html
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42278
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-42287
analytic_story:
- sAMAccountName Spoofing and Domain Controller Impersonation
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1078.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4781 OldTargetUserName="*$" NewTargetUserName!="*$") OR (EventCode=4768 TargetUserName!="*$")
Stage 2: eval
| eval RenamedComputerAccount = coalesce(NewTargetUserName, TargetUserName)
Stage 3: transaction implicit 300s window
| transaction RenamedComputerAccount startswith=(EventCode=4781) endswith=(EventCode=4768)
Stage 4: eval
| eval short_lived=case((duration<2),"TRUE")
short_lived =else
"TRUE"Stage 5: search
| search short_lived = TRUE
Stage 6: table
| table _time, Computer, EventCode, TargetUserName, RenamedComputerAccount, short_lived
Stage 7: rename
| rename Computer as dest
Stage 8: search
| `suspicious_ticket_granting_ticket_request_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq |
NewTargetUserName | ne |
| field:"NewTargetUserName" kind:ne |
OldTargetUserName | eq |
| field:"OldTargetUserName" kind:eq |
TargetUserName | ne |
| field:"TargetUserName" kind:ne |
short_lived | eq |
| field:"short_lived" kind:eq value:"TRUE" |