Time Provider Persistence Registry

name: Time Provider Persistence Registry
id: 5ba382c4-2105-11ec-8d8f-acde48001122
version: 16
creation_date: '2021-09-29'
modification_date: '2026-07-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk, Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
    The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the time provider registry for persistence and autostart. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders" registry path.
    This activity is significant because such modifications are uncommon and can indicate an attempt to establish persistence on a compromised host.
    If confirmed malicious, this technique allows an attacker to maintain access and execute code automatically upon system boot, potentially leading to further exploitation and control over the affected system.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    
    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
    
    Registry.registry_path="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\*"
    Registry.registry_value_name = "DllName"
    NOT Registry.registry_value_data IN
    (
        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll",
        "%SystemRoot%\\System32\\w32time.dll",
        "C:\\Windows\\System32\\vmictimeprovider.dll",
        "C:\\Windows\\System32\\w32time.dll"
    )
    
    by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
       Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
       Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type
       Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
    
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `time_provider_persistence_registry_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/22/persistence-time-providers/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/003/
finding:
    title: modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: modified/added/deleted registry entry $registry_path$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Hermetic Wiper
    - Windows Privilege Escalation
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Windows Registry Abuse
    - Data Destruction
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1547.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint