Detection rules › Splunk

UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
dest, image_loaded, original_file_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by the MMC.exe application, which is indicative of a potential UAC bypass or privilege escalation attempt. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where MMC.exe loads a non-Microsoft, unsigned DLL. This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to modify CLSID registry entries, causing MMC.exe to load malicious DLLs, thereby bypassing User Account Control (UAC) and gaining elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time. dll.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 7: Image loaded

Rule body

name: UAC Bypass MMC Load Unsigned Dll
id: 7f04349c-e30d-11eb-bc7f-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-07-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the loading of an unsigned DLL by the MMC.exe application, which is indicative of a potential UAC bypass or privilege escalation attempt. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where MMC.exe loads a non-Microsoft, unsigned DLL. This activity is significant because attackers often use this technique to modify CLSID registry entries, causing MMC.exe to load malicious DLLs, thereby bypassing User Account Control (UAC) and gaining elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded = "*.dll" Image = "*\\mmc.exe" Signed=false Company != "Microsoft Corporation" | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time. dll.
references:
    - https://offsec.almond.consulting/UAC-bypass-dotnet.html
finding:
    title: Suspicious unsigned $ImageLoaded$ loaded by $Image$ on endpoint $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.014
    - T1548.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=7  ImageLoaded = "*.dll" Image = "*\\mmc.exe" Signed=false Company != "Microsoft Corporation"

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `uac_bypass_mmc_load_unsigned_dll_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
Companyne
  • "Microsoft Corporation"
field:"Company" kind:ne
EventCodeeq
  • 7 corpus 41 (splunk 39, elastic 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7"
Imageeq
  • "*\\mmc.exe"
field:"Image" kind:eq
ImageLoadedeq
  • "*.dll" corpus 6 (sigma 3, splunk 3)
field:"ImageLoaded" kind:eq
Signedeq
  • false corpus 9 (splunk 5, sigma 4)
field:"Signed" kind:eq value:"false"