Detection rules › Splunk

UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
dest, image_loaded, original_file_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, service_dll_signature_exists, service_dll_signature_verified, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.

Known false positives

  • not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 7: Image loaded

Rule body

name: UAC Bypass With Colorui COM Object
id: 2bcccd20-fc2b-11eb-8d22-acde48001122
version: 11
creation_date: '2021-08-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a potential UAC bypass using the colorui.dll COM Object. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where colorui.dll is loaded by a process other than colorcpl.exe, excluding common system directories. This activity is significant because UAC bypass techniques are often used by malware, such as LockBit ransomware, to gain elevated privileges without user consent. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code with higher privileges, leading to further system compromise and persistence within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 7
search: '`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*")) | fillnull | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: not so common. but 3rd part app may load this dll.
references:
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/24/lockbit-ransomware-borrows-tricks-to-keep-up-with-revil-and-maze/
finding:
    title: The following module $ImageLoaded$ was loaded by a non-standard application on endpoint $dest$.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Ransomware
    - LockBit Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\colorui.dll" process_name != "colorcpl.exe" NOT(Image IN("*\\windows\\*", "*\\program files*"))

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded dest loaded_file loaded_file_path original_file_name process_exec process_guid process_hash process_id process_name process_path service_dll_signature_exists service_dll_signature_verified signature signature_id user_id vendor_product

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `uac_bypass_with_colorui_com_object_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
Imagein"*\\program files*", "*\\windows\\*"excludes:Image

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 7 corpus 41 (splunk 39, elastic 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"7"
ImageLoadedeq
  • "*\\colorui.dll"
field:"ImageLoaded" kind:eq
process_namene
  • "colorcpl.exe"
field:"process_name" kind:ne