Detection rules › Splunk

Unusual AppCert Child Process (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Threat actors may exploit legitimate developer utilities to execute malicious payloads by proxy. One such utility is appcert.exe, a command-line tool included in the Windows Application Certification Kit, which is typically used to verify the compliance of Windows applications with Microsoft's certification standards. This use case detects appcert launching child processes outside of known good paths C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\10\App Certification Kit\ and C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\App Certification Kit\

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '35215.61888'
title: Unusual AppCert Child Process
description: Threat actors may exploit legitimate developer utilities to execute malicious
  payloads by proxy. One such utility is appcert.exe, a command-line tool included
  in the Windows Application Certification Kit, which is typically used to verify
  the compliance of Windows applications with Microsoft's certification standards.
  This use case detects appcert launching child processes outside of known good paths
  C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\10\App Certification Kit\ and C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows
  Kits\10\App Certification Kit\. Living Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS)
  (LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  (TERM(appcert) OR "appcert.exe") | regex parent_process_name="(?i)^appcert.exe"|
  regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cProgram\sFiles(\s\(x86\))?\x5cWindows\sKits\x5c10\x5c"
  | table _time, host, user, process, signature_id, parent_process_*, process_* |
  bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:trusted developer utilities proxy execution
technique_id: 
- T1127
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Appcert/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") (TERM(appcert) OR "appcert.exe")

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_name="(?i)^appcert.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cProgram\sFiles(\s\(x86\))?\x5cWindows\sKits\x5c10\x5c"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, signature_id, parent_process_*, process_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process_pathregex_match"(?i)\x5cProgram\sFiles(\s(x86))?\x5cWindows\sKits\x5c10\x5c"excludes:process_path

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
parent_process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)^appcert.exe" corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1appcert
1"appcert.exe"