Detection rules › Splunk
Unusual AppCert Child Process (Windows Event Log)
Threat actors may exploit legitimate developer utilities to execute malicious payloads by proxy. One such utility is appcert.exe, a command-line tool included in the Windows Application Certification Kit, which is typically used to verify the compliance of Windows applications with Microsoft's certification standards. This use case detects appcert launching child processes outside of known good paths C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\10\App Certification Kit\ and C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\App Certification Kit\
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | |
| Stealth |
References
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688: A new process has been created. |
Rule body
id: '35215.61886'
title: Unusual AppCert Child Process
description: Threat actors may exploit legitimate developer utilities to execute malicious
payloads by proxy. One such utility is appcert.exe, a command-line tool included
in the Windows Application Certification Kit, which is typically used to verify
the compliance of Windows applications with Microsoft's certification standards.
This use case detects appcert launching child processes outside of known good paths
C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\10\App Certification Kit\ and C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows
Kits\10\App Certification Kit\. Living Off the Land Binary and Scripts (LOLBAS)
(LOLBIN)
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) (TERM(appcert) OR "appcert.exe") | regex parent_process_name="(?i)^appcert.exe"|
regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cProgram\sFiles(\s\(x86\))?\x5cWindows\sKits\x5c10\x5c"
| table _time, host, user, process, signature_id, parent_process_*, process_* |
bin span=1s | stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- defense-evasion:trusted developer utilities proxy execution
technique_id:
- T1127
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/007/
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Appcert/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) (TERM(appcert) OR "appcert.exe")
Stage 2: regex
| regex parent_process_name="(?i)^appcert.exe"
Stage 3: regex
| regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cProgram\sFiles(\s\(x86\))?\x5cWindows\sKits\x5c10\x5c"
Stage 4: table
| table _time, host, user, process, signature_id, parent_process_*, process_*
Stage 5: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 6: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process_path | regex_match | "(?i)\x5cProgram\sFiles(\s(x86))?\x5cWindows\sKits\x5c10\x5c" | excludes:process_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4688" |
parent_process_name | regex_match |
| field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match |
Search terms
These SPL tokens match against raw event text.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | appcert |
| 1 | "appcert.exe" |