Detection rules › Splunk

Unusual winlogon.exe Child Process (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Winlogon.exe is a core Windows process that manages secure user authentication events, such as logon, logoff, and screen locking. Expected child processes include LogonUI.exe for the login screen, FontDrvHost.exe for font rendering in secure sessions, Userinit.exe for initializing user settings, Consent.exe for User Account Control (UAC) prompts, and Sihost.exe for managing shell experience components like the Start menu and taskbar. This use case detects unexpected child processes spawned by winlogon.exe.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Telemetry coverage

ProviderRecord / event type
SysmonEvent ID 1: Process creation

Rule body

id: '39293.71042'
title: Unusual winlogon.exe Child Process
description: Winlogon.exe is a core Windows process that manages secure user authentication
  events, such as logon, logoff, and screen locking. Expected child processes include
  LogonUI.exe for the login screen, FontDrvHost.exe for font rendering in secure sessions,
  Userinit.exe for initializing user settings, Consent.exe for User Account Control
  (UAC) prompts, and Sihost.exe for managing shell experience components like the
  Start menu and taskbar. This use case detects unexpected child processes spawned
  by winlogon.exe.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  TERM(winlogon) OR "winlogon.exe" | regex parent_process_name="(?i)winlogon\.exe"|
  regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5c(AtBroker|LogonUI|dwm|fontdrvhost|userinit|consent|sihost)\.exe"
  | table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*)
  as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- persistence:boot or logon autostart execution:winlogon helper dll
- privilege-escalation:boot or logon autostart execution:winlogon helper dll
technique_id:
- T1547.004
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://github.com/tykawaii98/CVE-2024-30088
- https://securityonline.info/poc-exploit-published-for-windows-kernel-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2024-30088/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") TERM(winlogon) OR "winlogon.exe"

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_name="(?i)winlogon\.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5c(AtBroker|LogonUI|dwm|fontdrvhost|userinit|consent|sihost)\.exe"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
process_pathregex_match"(?i)\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5c(AtBroker|LogonUI|dwm|fontdrvhost|userinit|consent|sihost).exe"excludes:process_path

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 241 (splunk 225, kusto 15, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"1"
parent_process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)winlogon.exe" corpus 3 (splunk 3)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:regex_match

Search terms

These SPL tokens match against raw event text.

StageTerm
1"<EventID>1<"
1winlogon
1"winlogon.exe"