Detection rules › Splunk

Unusual winlogon.exe Child Process (Sysmon)

Group by
_time, host
Source
github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory

Winlogon.exe is a core Windows process that manages secure user authentication events, such as logon, logoff, and screen locking. Expected child processes include LogonUI.exe for the login screen, FontDrvHost.exe for font rendering in secure sessions, Userinit.exe for initializing user settings, Consent.exe for User Account Control (UAC) prompts, and Sihost.exe for managing shell experience components like the Start menu and taskbar. This use case detects unexpected child processes spawned by winlogon.exe.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 1Process creation

Rule body yaml

id: '39293.71042'
title: Unusual winlogon.exe Child Process
description: Winlogon.exe is a core Windows process that manages secure user authentication
  events, such as logon, logoff, and screen locking. Expected child processes include
  LogonUI.exe for the login screen, FontDrvHost.exe for font rendering in secure sessions,
  Userinit.exe for initializing user settings, Consent.exe for User Account Control
  (UAC) prompts, and Sihost.exe for managing shell experience components like the
  Start menu and taskbar. This use case detects unexpected child processes spawned
  by winlogon.exe.
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<")
  TERM(winlogon) OR "winlogon.exe" | regex parent_process_name="(?i)winlogon\.exe"|
  regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5c(AtBroker|LogonUI|dwm|fontdrvhost|userinit|consent|sihost)\.exe"
  | table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_* | bin span=1s | stats values(*)
  as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- persistence:boot or logon autostart execution:winlogon helper dll
- privilege-escalation:boot or logon autostart execution:winlogon helper dll
technique_id:
- T1547.004
data_category:
- Windows Sysmon
references:
- https://github.com/tykawaii98/CVE-2024-30088
- https://securityonline.info/poc-exploit-published-for-windows-kernel-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2024-30088/

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_sysmon` (TERM(EventCode=1) OR "<EventID>1<") TERM(winlogon) OR "winlogon.exe"

Stage 2: regex

| regex parent_process_name="(?i)winlogon\.exe"

Stage 3: regex

| regex process_path!="(?i)\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5c(AtBroker|LogonUI|dwm|fontdrvhost|userinit|consent|sihost)\.exe"

Stage 4: table

| table _time, host, user, process, process_*, parent_*

Stage 5: bucket

| bin span=1s

Stage 6: stats

| stats values(*) as * by _time, host

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

FieldKindExcluded values
process_pathregex_match"(?i)\x5cWindows\x5cSystem32\x5c(AtBroker|LogonUI|dwm|fontdrvhost|userinit|consent|sihost).exe"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 1 corpus 237 (splunk 224, kusto 13)
parent_process_nameregex_match
  • "(?i)winlogon.exe" corpus 3 (splunk 3)

Search terms

Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.

StageTerm
1TERM
1"<EventID>1<"
1TERM
1winlogon
1"winlogon.exe"