Detection rules › Splunk
Utility Archive Data (Windows Event Log)
An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip. Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Collection | T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
References
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body yaml
id: '5526.5751'
title: Utility Archive Data
description: 'An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to
exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data,
including 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip. Most utilities include functionality to encrypt
and/or compress data. -- Threat Actor Association: APT10/Cicada, APT27/Emissary
Panda, APT29/Nobelium/Cozy Bear, APT31, DarkSide, BlackMatter, FIN6, FIN7, Harvester,
Karakurt, Lancyfly, Lazarus, Mustang Panda (aka. Stately Taurus//Earth Preta/BRONZE
PRESIDENT/TA416/RedDelta), RedEyes, UNC5221, UTA0178. Volt Typhoon - Software Association:
Akira, AvosLocker, Clop, Conti, GhostShell, Hafnium, LockBit, Play, Quantum, Ransom
Cartel -- #TrendingThreat #Russia #Ukraine -- Atomics T1560.001 Test#1 Atomics T1560.001
Test#2 Atomics T1560.001 Test#3 Atomics T1560.001 Test#4'
logic_format: Splunk
logic: '`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR
"<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ("WinRAR.exe" OR "WinRAR" OR "rar.exe" OR "7zG.exe"
OR "peazip.exe" OR "powerarc.exe" OR "Bandizip.exe" OR "Zipware.exe" OR "7z*.exe"
OR "winzip*.exe") | regex process_name="(?i)(winrar|rar|7z*|peazip|powerarc|bandizip|zipware|winzip*)\.exe"
| table _time, host, user signature_id, process, process_*, parent_* | bin span=1s
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host '
techniques:
- collection:archive collected data:archive via utility
technique_id:
- T1560.001
data_category:
- Windows event logs
references:
- https://askleo.com/why-spammers-love-zip-files-and-how-you-need-to-stay-safe/
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`get_endpoint_data` `get_endpoint_data_winevent` (TERM(EventCode=4688) OR "<EventID>4688<" OR Type=Process) ("WinRAR.exe" OR "WinRAR" OR "rar.exe" OR "7zG.exe" OR "peazip.exe" OR "powerarc.exe" OR "Bandizip.exe" OR "Zipware.exe" OR "7z*.exe" OR "winzip*.exe")
Stage 2: regex
| regex process_name="(?i)(winrar|rar|7z*|peazip|powerarc|bandizip|zipware|winzip*)\.exe"
Stage 3: table
| table _time, host, user signature_id, process, process_*, parent_*
Stage 4: bucket
| bin span=1s
Stage 5: stats
| stats values(*) as * by _time, host
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
process_name | regex_match |
|
Search terms
Bare-string tokens in the SPL search body. Splunk matches each token against _raw (the untyped raw event text) anywhere it appears, not against a specific field. These don't surface in the Indicators table because they aren't predicates on a known field.
| Stage | Term |
|---|---|
| 1 | TERM |
| 1 | "<EventID>4688<" |
| 1 | "WinRAR.exe" |
| 1 | "WinRAR" |
| 1 | "rar.exe" |
| 1 | "7zG.exe" |
| 1 | "peazip.exe" |
| 1 | "powerarc.exe" |
| 1 | "Bandizip.exe" |
| 1 | "Zipware.exe" |
| 1 | "7z*.exe" |
| 1 | "winzip*.exe" |