Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
EnabledPrivilegeList, SubjectDomainName, TargetDomainName, TargetLogonId, action, computer_name, dest, process_id, process_name, user, user_sid
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects a process enabling the "SeDebugPrivilege" privilege token. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 4703, filtering out common legitimate processes. This activity is significant because SeDebugPrivilege allows a process to inspect and modify the memory of other processes, potentially leading to credential dumping or code injection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over system processes, enabling them to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information.

Known false positives

  • Some native binaries and browser applications may request SeDebugPrivilege. Filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege
id: 6ece9ed0-5f92-4315-889d-48560472b188
version: 23
creation_date: '2022-09-05'
modification_date: '2026-06-08'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects a process enabling the "SeDebugPrivilege" privilege token. It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 4703, filtering out common legitimate processes. This activity is significant because SeDebugPrivilege allows a process to inspect and modify the memory of other processes, potentially leading to credential dumping or code injection. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over system processes, enabling them to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4703
search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4703 EnabledPrivilegeList = "*SeDebugPrivilege*" AND NOT(ProcessName IN ("*\\Program File*", "*\\System32\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe*", "*\\System32\\svchost.exe*")) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer ProcessName ProcessId SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName SubjectUserSid TargetUserName TargetLogonId TargetDomainName EnabledPrivilegeList action dest | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_access_token_manipulation_sedebugprivilege_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4703 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: Some native binaries and browser applications may request SeDebugPrivilege. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4703
    - https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20080314-00/?p=23113
    - https://blog.palantir.com/windows-privilege-abuse-auditing-detection-and-defense-3078a403d74e
    - https://atomicredteam.io/privilege-escalation/T1134.001/#atomic-test-2---%60sedebugprivilege%60-token-duplication
    - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: Computer
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A process $ProcessName$ adjust its privileges with SeDebugPrivilege on $Computer$.
analytic_story:
    - Meduza Stealer
    - PlugX
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - China-Nexus Threat Activity
    - AsyncRAT
    - SnappyBee
    - Derusbi
    - WinDealer RAT
    - Salt Typhoon
    - DarkGate Malware
    - ValleyRAT
    - Brute Ratel C4
    - PathWiper
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Lokibot
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
    - Tuoni
    - Gh0st RAT
    - Salat Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1134.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4703 EnabledPrivilegeList = "*SeDebugPrivilege*" AND NOT(ProcessName IN ("*\\Program File*", "*\\System32\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe*", "*\\System32\\svchost.exe*"))

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer ProcessName ProcessId SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName SubjectUserSid TargetUserName TargetLogonId TargetDomainName EnabledPrivilegeList action dest

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_access_token_manipulation_sedebugprivilege_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
ProcessNamein"*\\Program File*", "*\\SysWOW64\\lsass.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe*", "*\\System32\\lsass.exe*", "*\\System32\\svchost.exe*"excludes:ProcessName

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EnabledPrivilegeListeq
  • "*SeDebugPrivilege*"
field:"EnabledPrivilegeList" kind:eq
EventCodeeq
  • 4703 corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4703"