Detection rules › Splunk

Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition

Status
production
Severity
medium
Author
Dean Luxton
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects across different domains. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute allows users to inherit permissions from other AD accounts, which can be exploited by adversaries for inter-domain privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to resources, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges across domain boundaries.

Known false positives

  • Domain mergers and migrations may generate large volumes of false positives for this analytic.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition
id: 41bbb371-28ba-439c-bb5c-d9930c28365d
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-09-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects across different domains. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute allows users to inherit permissions from other AD accounts, which can be exploited by adversaries for inter-domain privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to resources, maintain persistence, and escalate privileges across domain boundaries.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4742
    - Windows Event Log Security 4738
search: '`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) | rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-|\\\)" | where SidHistoryMatch!=TargetSidmatch AND SidHistoryMatch!=TargetDomainName | rename TargetSid as userSid | table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user dest | `windows_ad_cross_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcodes `4738` and `4742`. The Advanced Security Audit policy settings `Audit User Account Management` and  `Audit Computer Account Management` within `Account Management` all need to be enabled.
known_false_positives: Domain mergers and migrations may generate large volumes of false positives for this analytic.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-sidhistory?redirectedfrom=MSDN
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-assessment-unsecure-sid-history-attribute
finding:
    title: Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$
    entity:
        field: src_user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$
analytic_story:
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1134.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -)

Stage 2: rex

| rex field=SidHistory "(^%{|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-|\\\)"

Stage 3: rex

| rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-|\\\)"

Stage 4: where

| where SidHistoryMatch!=TargetSidmatch AND SidHistoryMatch!=TargetDomainName

Stage 5: rename

| rename TargetSid as userSid

Stage 6: table

| table _time action status host user userSid SidHistory Logon_ID src_user dest

Stage 7: search

| `windows_ad_cross_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
SidHistoryin"%%1793", -excludes:SidHistory

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4738 corpus 8 (splunk 4, elastic 3, kusto 1)
  • 4742 corpus 6 (splunk 6)
field:"EventID" kind:eq
SidHistoryMatchcross_field_compare
  • TargetDomainName transforms: op:ne corpus 2 (splunk 2)
  • TargetSidmatch transforms: op:ne corpus 2 (splunk 2)
field:"SidHistoryMatch" kind:cross_field_compare