Detection rules › Splunk
Windows AD DSRM Password Reset
The following analytic detects attempts to reset the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator password on a Domain Controller. It leverages event code 4794 from the Windows Security Event Log, specifically looking for events where the DSRM password reset is attempted. This activity is significant because the DSRM account can be used similarly to a local administrator account, providing potential persistence for an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain administrative access to the Domain Controller, posing a severe risk to the domain's security.
Known false positives
- Resetting the DSRM password for legitamate reasons, i.e. forgot the password. Disaster recovery. Deploying AD backdoor deliberately.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
Rule body
name: Windows AD DSRM Password Reset
id: d1ab841c-36a6-46cf-b50f-b2b04b31182a
version: 10
creation_date: '2022-09-08'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects attempts to reset the Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) administrator password on a Domain Controller. It leverages event code 4794 from the Windows Security Event Log, specifically looking for events where the DSRM password reset is attempted. This activity is significant because the DSRM account can be used similarly to a local administrator account, providing potential persistence for an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain administrative access to the Domain Controller, posing a severe risk to the domain's security.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4794
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time FROM datamodel=Change
WHERE All_Changes.result_id="4794"
AND
All_Changes.result="set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password"
BY All_Changes.action, All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.src,
All_Changes.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Changes)`
| `windows_ad_dsrm_password_reset_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcode `4794` and have the Advanced Security Audit policy `Audit User Account Management` within `Account Management` enabled.
known_false_positives: Resetting the DSRM password for legitamate reasons, i.e. forgot the password. Disaster recovery. Deploying AD backdoor deliberately.
references:
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714
finding:
title: DSRM Account Password was reset on $dest$ by $user$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: DSRM Account Password was reset on $dest$ by $user$
analytic_story:
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
- Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as _time FROM datamodel=Change
WHERE All_Changes.result_id="4794"
AND
All_Changes.result="set the Directory Services Restore Mode administrator password"
BY All_Changes.action, All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.src,
All_Changes.user
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Changes)`
Stage 3: search
| `windows_ad_dsrm_password_reset_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
All_Changes.result | eq |
| field:"All_Changes.result" kind:eq |
All_Changes.result_id | eq |
| field:"All_Changes.result_id" kind:eq |