Windows AD Object Owner Updated

name: Windows AD Object Owner Updated
id: 4af01f6b-d8d4-4f96-8635-758a01557130
version: 12
creation_date: '2024-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
description: AD Object Owner Updated. The owner provides Full control level privileges over the target AD Object. This event has significant impact alone and is also a precursor activity for hiding an AD object.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 5136
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136
      | stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14675",AttributeValue,null))) as old_value values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14674",AttributeValue,null))) as new_value values(OperationType) as OperationType values(dest) as dest
        BY ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID
           src_user SubjectLogonId DSName
      | rex field=old_value "O:(?P<old_owner>.*?)G:"
      | rex field=new_value "O:(?P<new_owner>.*?)G:"
      | where old_owner!=new_owner ``` optional SID resolution lookups
      | lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as new_owner OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as new_owner_user
      | lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as new_owner OUTPUT cn as new_owner_group
      | lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as old_owner OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as old_owner_user
      | lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as old_owner OUTPUT cn as old_owner_group ```
      | lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string  as new_owner_group OUTPUT builtin_group_name as new_owner_group_builtin_group
      | lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string  as old_owner OUTPUT builtin_group_name as old_owner_group_builtin_group
      | eval user=coalesce(new_owner_user, new_owner_group, new_owner_group_builtin_group, new_owner), previousOwner=coalesce(old_owner_user, old_owner_group, old_owner_group_builtin_group, old_owner)
      | stats values(previousOwner) as previousOwner values(user) as user values(SubjectLogonId) as SubjectLogonId
        BY _time ObjectClass ObjectDN
           src_user OpCorrelationID DSName
      | `windows_ad_object_owner_updated_filter`
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes and include lookups for SID resolution if evt_resolve_ad_obj is set to 0.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/ace-strings
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/1522b774-6464-41a3-87a5-1e5633c3fbbb
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
    - https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
finding:
    title: $src_user$ has made $user$ the owner of AD object $ObjectDN$
    entity:
        field: src_user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 50
          message: $src_user$ has made $user$ the owner of AD object $ObjectDN$
analytic_story:
    - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1222.001
    - T1484
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint