Detection rules › Splunk
Windows AD Object Owner Updated
AD Object Owner Updated. The owner provides Full control level privileges over the target AD Object. This event has significant impact alone and is also a precursor activity for hiding an AD object.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification |
| Defense Impairment | T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions, T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5136 | A directory service object was modified. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows AD Object Owner Updated
id: 4af01f6b-d8d4-4f96-8635-758a01557130
version: 12
creation_date: '2024-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
description: AD Object Owner Updated. The owner provides Full control level privileges over the target AD Object. This event has significant impact alone and is also a precursor activity for hiding an AD object.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5136
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136
| stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14675",AttributeValue,null))) as old_value values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14674",AttributeValue,null))) as new_value values(OperationType) as OperationType values(dest) as dest
BY ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID
src_user SubjectLogonId DSName
| rex field=old_value "O:(?P<old_owner>.*?)G:"
| rex field=new_value "O:(?P<new_owner>.*?)G:"
| where old_owner!=new_owner ``` optional SID resolution lookups
| lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as new_owner OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as new_owner_user
| lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as new_owner OUTPUT cn as new_owner_group
| lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as old_owner OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as old_owner_user
| lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as old_owner OUTPUT cn as old_owner_group ```
| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as new_owner_group OUTPUT builtin_group_name as new_owner_group_builtin_group
| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as old_owner OUTPUT builtin_group_name as old_owner_group_builtin_group
| eval user=coalesce(new_owner_user, new_owner_group, new_owner_group_builtin_group, new_owner), previousOwner=coalesce(old_owner_user, old_owner_group, old_owner_group_builtin_group, old_owner)
| stats values(previousOwner) as previousOwner values(user) as user values(SubjectLogonId) as SubjectLogonId
BY _time ObjectClass ObjectDN
src_user OpCorrelationID DSName
| `windows_ad_object_owner_updated_filter`
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes and include lookups for SID resolution if evt_resolve_ad_obj is set to 0.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/ace-strings
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/1522b774-6464-41a3-87a5-1e5633c3fbbb
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
- https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$src_user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" src_user = "$src_user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$src_user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$src_user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: $src_user$ has made $user$ the owner of AD object $ObjectDN$
entity:
field: src_user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 50
message: $src_user$ has made $user$ the owner of AD object $ObjectDN$
analytic_story:
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1222.001
- T1484
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/dacl_abuse/owner_updated_windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136
Stage 2: stats
| stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14675",AttributeValue,null))) as old_value values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14674",AttributeValue,null))) as new_value values(OperationType) as OperationType values(dest) as dest
BY ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID
src_user SubjectLogonId DSName
Stage 3: rex
| rex field=old_value "O:(?P<old_owner>.*?)G:"
Stage 4: rex
| rex field=new_value "O:(?P<new_owner>.*?)G:"
Stage 5: where
| where old_owner!=new_owner
Stage 6: lookup
| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as new_owner_group OUTPUT builtin_group_name as new_owner_group_builtin_group
Stage 7: lookup
| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as old_owner OUTPUT builtin_group_name as old_owner_group_builtin_group
Stage 8: eval
| eval user=coalesce(new_owner_user, new_owner_group, new_owner_group_builtin_group, new_owner), previousOwner=coalesce(old_owner_user, old_owner_group, old_owner_group_builtin_group, old_owner)
Stage 9: stats
| stats values(previousOwner) as previousOwner values(user) as user values(SubjectLogonId) as SubjectLogonId
BY _time ObjectClass ObjectDN
src_user OpCorrelationID DSName
Stage 10: search
| `windows_ad_object_owner_updated_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|