Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account

name: Windows AD Replication Request Initiated by User Account
id: 51307514-1236-49f6-8686-d46d93cc2821
version: 15
creation_date: '2022-11-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a user account initiating an Active Directory replication request, indicative of a DCSync attack. It leverages EventCode 4662 from the Windows Security Event Log, focusing on specific object types and replication permissions. This activity is significant because it can allow an attacker with sufficient privileges to request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and potential compromise of the entire domain.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4662
    - Windows Event Log Security 4624
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}","domainDNS")
      AND Properties IN ("*Replicating Directory Changes All*","*Manage Replication Topology*","*Remove Replica In Domain*","*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*","*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*","*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*")
      AND AccessMask="0x100" AND NOT (SubjectUserSid="NT AUT*" OR SubjectUserSid="S-1-5-18" OR SubjectDomainName="Window Manager" OR SubjectUserName="*$")
    | stats min(_time) as _time, count by SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Computer, Logon_ID, ObjectName, ObjectServer, ObjectType, OperationType, status dest
    | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain, SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId, _time as attack_time
    | appendpipe
        [| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"
        | fields - status]
    | stats min(attack_time) as _time values(TargetUserSid) as TargetUserSid, values(Target_Domain) as Target_Domain, values(user) as user, values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as
        src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(action) as action values(authentication_method) as authentication_method values(dest) as dest values(signature) as signature values(signature_id) as signature_id by TargetLogonId
    | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_by_user_account_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcode `4662`. The Advanced Security Audit policy settings `Audit Directory Services Access` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled, as well as the following SACLs applied to the domain root and all descendant objects. The principals `everybody`,  `Domain Computers`, and  `Domain Controllers` auditing the permissions `Replicating Directory Changes`, `Replicating Directory Changes All`, and `Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set`
known_false_positives: Azure AD Connect syncing operations and the dcdiag.exe /Test:Replications command.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mimikatz-dcsync-event-log-detections-john-dwyer
    - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0.22-699-g29a5c6278/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dcsync.yml
finding:
    title: Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated by User Account $user$ from $src_ip$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: src_ip
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated by User Account $user$ from $src_ip$
analytic_story:
    - Compromised Windows Host
    - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
    - Credential Dumping
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1003.006
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint