Detection rules › Splunk
Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification
This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes: "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink", "scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram". Modifications to these attributes can indicate potential malicious activity or privilege escalation attempts. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment | T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Windows Permissions |
| Lateral Movement | T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4624 | An account was successfully logged on. |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 5136 | A directory service object was modified. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows AD Suspicious Attribute Modification
id: 5682052e-ce55-4f9f-8d28-59191420b7e0
version: 10
creation_date: '2024-07-01'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: production
type: TTP
description: 'This detection monitors changes to the following Active Directory attributes: "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo", "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity", "msDS-KeyCredentialLink", "scriptPath", and "msTSInitialProgram". Modifications to these attributes can indicate potential malicious activity or privilege escalation attempts. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.'
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 5136
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName IN ("msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo","msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity","scriptPath","msTSInitialProgram") OperationType=%%14674 ```Changes to the attribute "msDS-KeyCredentialLink" are also worth moniroting, however tuning will need to be applied```
| table _time ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName AttributeValue AttributeLDAPDisplayName
| rename SubjectLogonId as TargetLogonId, src_user as initiator, _time as eventTime
| appendpipe [
| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"]
| stats min(eventTime) as _time values(initiator) as src_user, values(DSName) as targetDomain, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN, values(ObjectClass) as ObjectClass, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(LogonType) as LogonType values(AttributeValue) as AttributeValue values(AttributeLDAPDisplayName) as AttributeLDAPDisplayName
BY TargetLogonId
| rex field=ObjectDN "^CN=(?P<cn>.*?),[A-Z]{2}\="
| eval dest=if(ObjectClass="computer",cn,null), user=if(ObjectClass="user",cn,null)
| fields - cn
| `windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification_filter`
how_to_implement: Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes.
known_false_positives: If key credentials are regularly assigned to users, these events will need to be tuned out.
references:
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
- https://lantern.splunk.com/Security/Product_Tips/Enterprise_Security/Enabling_an_audit_trail_from_Active_Directory
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$src_user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search src_user = "$src_user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src_user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src_user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: $src_user$ has added $AttributeLDAPDisplayName$ ACL rights to $ObjectClass$ $ObjectDN$
entity:
field: src_user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: $src_user$ has added $AttributeLDAPDisplayName$ ACL rights to $ObjectClass$ $ObjectDN$
analytic_story:
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1222.001
- T1550
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1222.001/dacl_abuse/suspicious_acl_modification-windows-security-xml.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName IN ("msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo","msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity","scriptPath","msTSInitialProgram") OperationType=%%14674
Stage 2: table
| table _time ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName AttributeValue AttributeLDAPDisplayName
Stage 3: rename
| rename SubjectLogonId as TargetLogonId, src_user as initiator, _time as eventTime
Stage 4: appendpipe
| appendpipe [
| map search="search `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"]
Stage 5: stats
| stats min(eventTime) as _time values(initiator) as src_user, values(DSName) as targetDomain, values(ObjectDN) as ObjectDN, values(ObjectClass) as ObjectClass, values(src_category) as src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip values(LogonType) as LogonType values(AttributeValue) as AttributeValue values(AttributeLDAPDisplayName) as AttributeLDAPDisplayName
BY TargetLogonId
Stage 6: rex
| rex field=ObjectDN "^CN=(?P<cn>.*?),[A-Z]{2}\="
Stage 7: eval
| eval dest=if(ObjectClass="computer",cn,null), user=if(ObjectClass="user",cn,null)
dest =ObjectClass = "computer"cnnulluser =ObjectClass = "user"cnnullStage 8: fields
| fields - cn
Stage 9: search
| `windows_ad_suspicious_attribute_modification_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
AttributeLDAPDisplayName | in |
|
EventCode | eq |
|
OperationType | eq |
|