Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution
The following analytic detects when a process attempts to execute a file from within an NTFS file system alternate data stream. This detection leverages process execution data from sources like Windows process monitoring or Sysmon Event ID 1, focusing on specific processes known for such behavior. This activity is significant because alternate data streams can be used by threat actors to hide malicious code, making it difficult to detect. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and further compromise of the system.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1564.004 Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Alternate DataStream - Process Execution
id: 30c32c5c-41fe-45db-84fe-275e4320da3f
version: 13
creation_date: '2024-01-10'
modification_date: '2026-06-04'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects when a process attempts to execute a file from within an NTFS file system alternate data stream. This detection leverages process execution data from sources like Windows process monitoring or Sysmon Event ID 1, focusing on specific processes known for such behavior. This activity is significant because alternate data streams can be used by threat actors to hide malicious code, making it difficult to detect. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized actions and further compromise of the system.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: |-
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_current_directory) as directory
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.parent_process_name != "unknown"
Processes.process_name IN (
"appvlp.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe",
"control.exe",
"cscript.exe",
"forfiles.exe",
"ftp.exe",
"mavinject.exe",
"mshta.exe",
"powershell_ise.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
"regini.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
"rundll32.exe",
"sc.exe",
"wmic.exe",
"wscript.exe"
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| regex process="(\b)\w+(\.\w+)?:\w+(\.\w{2,4})(?!\.)(\b|\s|&)"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_alternate_datastream___process_execution_filter`
how_to_implement: Target environment must ingest process execution data sources such as Windows process monitoring and/or Sysmon EventID 1.
known_false_positives: False positives may be generated by process executions within the commandline, regex has been provided to minimize the possibilty.
references:
- https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f
- https://car.mitre.org/analytics/CAR-2020-08-001/
- https://blogs.juniper.net/en-us/threat-research/bitpaymer-ransomware-hides-behind-windows-alternate-data-streams
- https://blog.netwrix.com/2022/12/16/alternate_data_stream/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: The $process_name$ process was executed by $user$ using data from an NTFS alternate data stream.
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: The $process_name$ process was executed by $user$ using data from an NTFS alternate data stream.
threat_objects:
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Compromised Windows Host
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1564.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1564.004/ads_abuse/ads_abuse_sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_current_directory) as directory
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.parent_process_name != "unknown"
Processes.process_name IN (
"appvlp.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe",
"control.exe",
"cscript.exe",
"forfiles.exe",
"ftp.exe",
"mavinject.exe",
"mshta.exe",
"powershell_ise.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
"regini.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
"rundll32.exe",
"sc.exe",
"wmic.exe",
"wscript.exe"
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: regex
| regex process="(\b)\w+(\.\w+)?:\w+(\.\w{2,4})(?!\.)(\b|\s|&)"
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `windows_alternate_datastream___process_execution_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.parent_process_name | ne |
|
Processes.process_name | in |
|
process | regex_match |
|