Detection rules › Splunk

Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
PipeName, dest, dvc, process_guid, process_id, process_name, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating or connecting to a named pipe. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify these actions. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe, a legitimate Windows OS Problem Reporting application, is often abused by malware such as Trickbot and Qakbot to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that an attacker has injected code into wermgr.exe, potentially allowing them to communicate covertly, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.

Known false positives

  • No false positives have been identified at this time.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & Control

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows App Layer Protocol Wermgr Connect To NamedPipe
id: 2f3a4092-548b-421c-9caa-84918e1787ef
version: 10
creation_date: '2022-10-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating or connecting to a named pipe. It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify these actions. This activity is significant because wermgr.exe, a legitimate Windows OS Problem Reporting application, is often abused by malware such as Trickbot and Qakbot to execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate that an attacker has injected code into wermgr.exe, potentially allowing them to communicate covertly, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 17
    - Sysmon EventID 18
search: '`sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) Image= "*\\wermgr.exe" EventType IN ( "CreatePipe", "ConnectPipe") | stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest dvc pipe_name process_exec process_guid process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product Image PipeName | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_app_layer_protocol_wermgr_connect_to_namedpipe_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, pipename, processguid and named pipe event type from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/wermgr.exe-0F652BF7ADA772981E8AAB0D108FCC92.html
    - https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/demystifying-qbot-malware.html
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: wermgr.exe process is creating or connecting to a named pipe $PipeName$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Qakbot
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1071
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode IN (17, 18) Image= "*\\wermgr.exe" EventType IN ( "CreatePipe", "ConnectPipe")

Stage 2: stats

| stats  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest dvc pipe_name process_exec process_guid process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id user_id vendor_product Image PipeName

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_app_layer_protocol_wermgr_connect_to_namedpipe_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodein
  • 17 corpus 5 (splunk 4, elastic 1)
  • 18 corpus 6 (splunk 4, chronicle 1, kusto 1)
field:"EventID" kind:in
EventTypein
  • "ConnectPipe"
  • "CreatePipe"
field:"EventType" kind:in
Imageeq
  • "*\\wermgr.exe"
field:"Image" kind:eq