Detection rules › Splunk
Windows AppCertDLL Modification Via Registry
This analytic detects attempts to modify AppCertDLL registry entries. Values under this registry entry are used to specify DLLs loaded by the Windows Session Manager. Such modifications can be abused by attackers to load malicious code early in the system startup process, enabling persistent malware execution with high privileges. If confirmed malicious, this behavior may lead to system compromise, persistence, and the evasion of security controls.
Known false positives
- Modifications to AppCertDLL entries may be made by legitimate software updates or trusted system management tools. Review changes to ensure they are from approved sources.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) |
Rule body
name: Windows AppCertDLL Modification Via Registry
id: 547d98dd-6d6e-4aa4-be91-a1a119f48df3
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-07-27'
modification_date: '2026-07-27'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
This analytic detects attempts to modify AppCertDLL registry entries.
Values under this registry entry are used to specify DLLs loaded by the Windows Session Manager.
Such modifications can be abused by attackers to load malicious code early in the system startup process, enabling persistent malware execution with high privileges.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior may lead to system compromise, persistence, and the evasion of security controls.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 13
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
Registry.action = "modified"
Registry.registry_path= "*\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDLLs\\*"
Registry.registry_value_data = "*"
by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_appcertdll_modification_via_registry_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the official Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
known_false_positives: |-
Modifications to AppCertDLL entries may be made by legitimate software updates or trusted system management tools. Review changes to ensure they are from approved sources.
references:
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: Potential AppCertDLL modification with value [$registry_value_data$] activity observed on [$dest$]
threat_objects:
- field: registry_value_data
type: registry_value_text
analytic_story:
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Windows Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1546.009
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE
Registry.action = "modified"
Registry.registry_path= "*\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDLLs\\*"
Registry.registry_value_data = "*"
by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id
Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name
Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status
Registry.user Registry.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
Stage 3: where
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `windows_appcertdll_modification_via_registry_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Registry.action | eq |
| field:"EventType" kind:eq |
Registry.registry_path | eq |
| field:"registry_path" kind:eq |
Registry.registry_value_data | eq |
| field:"Details" kind:eq |
registry_value_data | is_not_null | field:"Details" kind:is_not_null |