Windows AppX Deployment Package Installation Success

Status: production
Severity: low
Group by: dvc, signature_id, user_id
Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
Source: github.com/splunk/security_content

This analytic detects successful MSIX/AppX package installations on Windows systems by monitoring EventID 854 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational log. This event is generated when an MSIX/AppX package has been successfully installed on a system. While most package installations are legitimate, monitoring these events can help identify unauthorized or suspicious package installations, especially when correlated with other events such as unsigned package installations (EventID 603 with Flags=8388608) or full trust package installations (EventID 400 with HasFullTrust=true).

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1204.002` User Execution: Malicious File

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
AppXDeployment-Server	Event ID 854	Successfully added the following uri(s) to be processed: Path.

Rule body splunk

name: Windows AppX Deployment Package Installation Success
id: 1234abcd-5678-90ef-1234-56789abcdef0
version: 4
creation_date: '2025-08-18'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This analytic detects successful MSIX/AppX package installations on Windows systems by monitoring EventID 854 in the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server/Operational log. This event is generated when an MSIX/AppX package has been successfully installed on a system. While most package installations are legitimate, monitoring these events can help identify unauthorized or suspicious package installations, especially when correlated with other events such as unsigned package installations (EventID 603 with Flags=8388608) or full trust package installations (EventID 400 with HasFullTrust=true).
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log AppXDeployment-Server 854
search: |-
    `wineventlog_appxdeploymentserver` EventCode=854
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Path) as PackagePath
        BY dvc EventCode user_id
      | rename dvc as dest
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_appx_deployment_package_installation_success_filter`
how_to_implement: To implement this detection, you need to be collecting Windows Event Logs from your endpoints, specifically the Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeploymentServer/Operational log. Ensure that your Splunk deployment is ingesting these logs with the source type "XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeploymentServer/Operational". This detection works best when used in conjunction with other MSIX package abuse detections such as unsigned package installations (EventID 603) and full trust package installations (EventID 400).
known_false_positives: Legitimate MSIX/AppX package installations will trigger this detection. This is expected behavior and not necessarily indicative of malicious activity. This analytic is designed to provide visibility into package installations and should be used as part of a broader detection strategy. Consider correlating these events with other suspicious indicators such as unsigned packages or packages from unusual sources.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting
    - https://www.appdeploynews.com/packaging-types/msix/troubleshooting-an-msix-package/
    - https://www.advancedinstaller.com/msix-installation-or-launching-errors-and-fixes.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View related unsigned package installations for - "$dest$"
      search: 'source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeploymentServer/Operational" EventCode=603 Flags="8388608" host="$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View related full trust package installations for - "$dest$"
      search: 'source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeploymentServer/Operational" EventCode=400 HasFullTrust="true" host="$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A MSIX/AppX package $PackagePath$ was successfully installed on $dest$ by user $user_id$.
threat_objects:
    - field: PackagePath
      type: file_path
analytic_story:
    - MSIX Package Abuse
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1204.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1204.002/appx/windows_appxdeploymentserver.log
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeploymentServer/Operational
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

`wineventlog_appxdeploymentserver` EventCode=854

Stage 2: `stats`

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Path) as PackagePath
    BY dvc EventCode user_id

Stage 3: `rename`

| rename dvc as dest

Stage 4: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: `search`

| `windows_appx_deployment_package_installation_success_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventCode`	eq	`854`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Windows AppX Deployment Package Installation Success

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `stats`

Stage 3: `rename`

Stage 4: `search`

Stage 5: `search`

Stage 6: `search`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Windows AppX Deployment Package Installation Success

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

Stage 2: stats

Stage 3: rename

Stage 4: search

Stage 5: search

Stage 6: search

Indicators

Stage 1: `search`

Stage 2: `stats`

Stage 3: `rename`

Stage 4: `search`

Stage 5: `search`

Stage 6: `search`