Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Binary Execution from an Archive
Detects the execution of a binary from archive-related paths in the user's Temp directory. It looks for binaries launched by explorer.exe, winrar.exe, or 7zFM.exe, where the executed process path includes Temp and archive markers such as RAR, 7z, or ZIP. This was abused by attackers to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) such as CVE-2025-0411 or exploit certain vulnerabilities.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Binary Execution from an Archive
id: 1516a16f-391e-457f-b9a3-a81dfdf218a6
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: experimental
type: Anomaly
description: |-
Detects the execution of a binary from archive-related paths in the user's Temp directory.
It looks for binaries launched by `explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`, where the executed process path includes Temp and archive markers such as RAR, 7z, or ZIP.
This was abused by attackers to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) such as CVE-2025-0411 or exploit certain vulnerabilities.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.parent_process_name IN (
"explorer.exe",
"winrar.exe",
"7zFM.exe"
)
Processes.process_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*"
Processes.process_path IN (
"*\\rar*",
"*\\7z*",
"*.zip*"
)
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
Processes.user Processes.process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_binary_execution_from_an_archive_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Some installers, administrative packages, or automation workflows may extract and run binaries from archive files in temporary directories. Review the parent process, executed path, and user context before tuning approved activity.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/scarlet-goldfinch/
drilldown_searches:
- earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: $process_name$ executed from an archive-related Temp path $process_path$ by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ using command line $process$.
- field: user
type: user
score: 20
message: $process_name$ executed from an archive-related Temp path $process_path$ by $parent_process_name$ on $dest$ using command line $process$.
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process
type: process
- field: process_name
type: process_name
- field: process_path
type: file_path
analytic_story:
- Spearphishing Attachments
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1204.002
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.parent_process_name IN (
"explorer.exe",
"winrar.exe",
"7zFM.exe"
)
Processes.process_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*"
Processes.process_path IN (
"*\\rar*",
"*\\7z*",
"*.zip*"
)
by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id
Processes.user Processes.process_name
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_binary_execution_from_an_archive_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.parent_process_name | in |
|
Processes.process_path | eq |
|
Processes.process_path | in |
|