Detection rules › Splunk
Windows BitLockerToGo with Network Activity
The following analytic detects suspicious usage of BitLockerToGo.exe, which has been observed being abused by Lumma stealer malware. The malware leverages this legitimate Windows utility to manipulate registry keys, search for cryptocurrency wallets and credentials, and exfiltrate sensitive data. This activity is significant because BitLockerToGo.exe provides functionality for viewing, copying, and writing files as well as modifying registry branches - capabilities that the Lumma stealer exploits for malicious purposes. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active data theft campaign targeting cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, and password manager archives. The detection focuses on identifying BitLockerToGo.exe execution patterns that deviate from normal system behavior.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 22 | DNSEvent (DNS query) |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows BitLockerToGo with Network Activity
id: 14e3a089-cc23-4f4d-a770-26e44a31fbac
version: 8
creation_date: '2024-11-13'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects suspicious usage of BitLockerToGo.exe, which has been observed being abused by Lumma stealer malware. The malware leverages this legitimate Windows utility to manipulate registry keys, search for cryptocurrency wallets and credentials, and exfiltrate sensitive data. This activity is significant because BitLockerToGo.exe provides functionality for viewing, copying, and writing files as well as modifying registry branches - capabilities that the Lumma stealer exploits for malicious purposes. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active data theft campaign targeting cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, and password manager archives. The detection focuses on identifying BitLockerToGo.exe execution patterns that deviate from normal system behavior.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 22
search: |-
`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="bitlockertogo.exe"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY answer answer_count dvc
process_exec process_guid process_name
query query_count reply_code_id
signature signature_id src
user_id vendor_product QueryName
QueryResults QueryStatus
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_bitlockertogo_with_network_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: False positives are likely, as BitLockerToGo.exe is a legitimate Windows utility used for managing BitLocker encryption. However, the detection is designed to flag unusual execution patterns that deviate from standard usage. Filtering may be required to reduce false positives, once confirmed - move to TTP.
references:
- https://any.run/report/5e9ba24639f70787e56f10a241271ae819ef9c573edb22b9eeade7cb40a2df2a/66f16c7b-2cfc-40c5-91cc-f1cbe9743fa3
- https://securelist.com/fake-captcha-delivers-lumma-amadey/114312/
analytic_story:
- Lumma Stealer
- Hellcat Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218/bitlockertogo/bitlockertogo_windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`sysmon` EventCode=22 process_name="bitlockertogo.exe"
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY answer answer_count dvc
process_exec process_guid process_name
query query_count reply_code_id
signature signature_id src
user_id vendor_product QueryName
QueryResults QueryStatus
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_bitlockertogo_with_network_activity_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
|
process_name | eq |
|