Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query

name: Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query
id: 40ccb8e0-1785-466e-901e-6a8b75c04ecd
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-12-06'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic identifies a process command line querying the CachedLogonsCount registry value in the Winlogon registry. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and registry queries. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate the use of post-exploitation tools like Winpeas, which gather information about login caching settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could help attackers understand login caching configurations, potentially aiding in credential theft or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where  `process_reg` AND Processes.process = "* query *" AND Processes.process = "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Processes.process = "*CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT*" by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_cached_domain_credentials_reg_query_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/troubleshoot/windows-server/user-profiles-and-logon/cached-domain-logon-information
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/winPEAS
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: a process with commandline $process$ tries to retrieve cache domain credential logon count on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Windows Post-Exploitation
    - Prestige Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1003.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint