Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line

Status: production
Severity: low
Group by: IntegrityLevel, command_line, computer_name, event_action, original_file_name, parent_command_line, parent_process_guid, parent_process_id, parent_process_name, process_guid, process_hash, process_id, process_name, user, user_id, vendor_product
Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source: github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects instances where Google Chrome is started with the --disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch flag, effectively enabling the loading of extensions via the command line. This may indicate attempts to bypass enterprise extension policies, load unauthorized or malicious extensions, or manipulate browser behavior. Monitoring this activity helps identify potential security policy violations, malware persistence techniques, or other suspicious Chrome modifications.

Known false positives

Developers or IT admins loading unpacked extensions for testing or deployment purposes.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Collection	`T1185` Browser Session Hijacking

Telemetry coverage

Provider	Record / event type
Sysmon	Event ID 1: Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688: A new process has been created.

Rule body

name: Windows Chrome Enable Extension Loading via Command-Line
id: da355155-1d23-48f9-bf95-e534ae273ab0
version: 4
creation_date: '2026-01-12'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    The following analytic detects instances where Google Chrome is started with the --disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch flag, effectively enabling the loading of extensions via the command line.
    This may indicate attempts to bypass enterprise extension policies, load unauthorized or malicious extensions, or manipulate browser behavior.
    Monitoring this activity helps identify potential security policy violations, malware persistence techniques, or other suspicious Chrome modifications.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
      Processes.process_name = "Chrome.exe"
      Processes.process= "*--disable-features*"
      Processes.process= "*DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch*"
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
       Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
       Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
       Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
       Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_chrome_enable_extension_loading_via_command_line_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: Developers or IT admins loading unpacked extensions for testing or deployment purposes.
references:
    - https://www.gdatasoftware.com/blog/2025/11/38298-learning-about-browser-hijacking
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A $process_name$ process attempted to enable browser extension loading via command line $process$ on $dest$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Browser Hijacking
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1185
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `tstats`

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
  Processes.process_name = "Chrome.exe"
  Processes.process= "*--disable-features*"
  Processes.process= "*DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch*"
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
   Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
   Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
   Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
   Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

Stage 2: `search`

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`

Stage 3: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: `search`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: `search`

| `windows_chrome_enable_extension_loading_via_command_line_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Field	Kind	Values	Search
`Processes.process`	eq	`"--disable-features"` `"DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch"`	`field:"CommandLine" kind:eq`
`Processes.process_name`	eq	`"Chrome.exe"` corpus 16 (elastic 14, splunk 2)	`field:"process_name" kind:eq`