Detection rules › Splunk

Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
Guid, Name, Opcode, Path, ScriptBlockId, ScriptBlockText, dest, process_id, signature, signature_id, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command 'Get-Clipboard' to retrieve clipboard data. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify instances where this command is used. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or other confidential data copied to the clipboard. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially compromising user accounts and other critical assets.

Known false positives

  • It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Collection

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard
id: ab73289e-2246-4de0-a14b-67006c72a893
version: 12
creation_date: '2022-12-06'
modification_date: '2026-06-29'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
    The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command 'Get-Clipboard' to retrieve clipboard data.
    It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify instances where this command is used.
    This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or other confidential data copied to the clipboard.
    If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially compromising user accounts and other critical assets.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell`
    EventCode=4104
    ScriptBlockText = "*Get-Clipboard*"
    | fillnull
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by dest signature signature_id
         user_id vendor_product EventID
         Guid Opcode Name
         Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
         ScriptBlockText
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_clipboard_data_via_get_clipboard_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://help.splunk.com/en/security-offerings/splunk-user-behavior-analytics/get-data-in/5.4.1/add-other-data-to-splunk-uba/configure-powershell-logging-to-see-powershell-anomalies-in-splunk-uba.
known_false_positives: It is possible there will be false positives, filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/
    - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/winPEAS
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/14/new-prestige-ransomware-impacts-organizations-in-ukraine-and-poland/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] containing Get-Clipboard commandlet to retrieve clipboard data was executed on host $dest$
        - field: user_id
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: A suspicious powershell script with the ScriptBlockId [$ScriptBlockId$] containing Get-Clipboard commandlet to retrieve clipboard data was executed on host $dest$ by user $user_id$
analytic_story:
    - Windows Post-Exploitation
    - Prestige Ransomware
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1115
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`powershell`
EventCode=4104
ScriptBlockText = "*Get-Clipboard*"

Stage 2: fillnull

| fillnull

Stage 3: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
              max(_time) as lastTime
  by dest signature signature_id
     user_id vendor_product EventID
     Guid Opcode Name
     Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
     ScriptBlockText

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 6: search

| `windows_clipboard_data_via_get_clipboard_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
EventCodeeq
  • 4104 corpus 269 (splunk 269)
field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4104"
ScriptBlockTexteq
  • "*Get-Clipboard*"
field:"ScriptBlockText" kind:eq