Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal
The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line executions, leveraging data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. It detects patterns in command-line arguments indicative of path traversal techniques, such as multiple instances of "/..", "..", or "\..". This activity is significant as it often indicates attempts to evade defenses by executing malicious code, such as through msdt.exe. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Command and Scripting Interpreter Hunting Path Traversal
id: d0026380-b3c4-4da0-ac8e-02790063ff6b
version: 8
creation_date: '2022-05-30'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: |
The following analytic identifies path traversal command-line executions,
leveraging data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. It detects patterns
in command-line arguments indicative of path traversal techniques, such as multiple
instances of "/..", "\..", or "\\..". This activity is significant as it often indicates
attempts to evade defenses by executing malicious code, such as through msdt.exe.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary
code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral
movement within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process IN ("*\\..*", "*//..*", "*\..*", "*/..*")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,"/.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,"\.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,"\\.."))-1)
| eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,"//.."))-1)
| search count_of_pattern1 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern2 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern3 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern4 > 1
| `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`
how_to_implement: |
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
False positives may vary depending on the score you want to check.
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/
analytic_story:
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool Vulnerability CVE-2022-30190
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1059
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059/path_traversal/sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
Processes.process IN ("*\\..*", "*//..*", "*\..*", "*/..*")
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process
Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id
Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: eval
| eval count_of_pattern1 = (mvcount(split(process,"/.."))-1)
Stage 6: eval
| eval count_of_pattern2 = (mvcount(split(process,"\.."))-1)
Stage 7: eval
| eval count_of_pattern3 = (mvcount(split(process,"\\.."))-1)
Stage 8: eval
| eval count_of_pattern4 = (mvcount(split(process,"//.."))-1)
Stage 9: search
| search count_of_pattern1 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern2 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern3 > 1
OR
count_of_pattern4 > 1
Stage 10: search
| `windows_command_and_scripting_interpreter_hunting_path_traversal_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.process | in |
|
count_of_pattern1 | gt |
|
count_of_pattern2 | gt |
|
count_of_pattern3 | gt |
|
count_of_pattern4 | gt |
|