Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket
The following analytic detects a computer account requesting a Kerberos ticket, which is unusual as typically user accounts request these tickets. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4768, to identify instances where the TargetUserName ends with a dollar sign ($), indicating a computer account. This activity is significant because it may indicate the use of tools like KrbUpRelay or other Kerberos-based attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to impersonate computer accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.
Known false positives
- It is possible false positives will be present based on third party applications. Filtering may be needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Credential Access |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4768: A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested. |
Rule body
name: Windows Computer Account Requesting Kerberos Ticket
id: fb3b2bb3-75a4-4279-848a-165b42624770
version: 10
creation_date: '2022-04-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects a computer account requesting a Kerberos ticket, which is unusual as typically user accounts request these tickets. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4768, to identify instances where the TargetUserName ends with a dollar sign ($), indicating a computer account. This activity is significant because it may indicate the use of tools like KrbUpRelay or other Kerberos-based attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to impersonate computer accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4768
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName="*$" src_ip!="::1"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest, subject, action,
user, TargetUserName, src_ip
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_computer_account_requesting_kerberos_ticket_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4768 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: It is possible false positives will be present based on third party applications. Filtering may be needed.
references:
- https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
finding:
title: A Computer Account requested a Kerberos ticket on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
- Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1558
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 TargetUserName="*$" src_ip!="::1"
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
BY dest, subject, action,
user, TargetUserName, src_ip
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_computer_account_requesting_kerberos_ticket_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4768" |
TargetUserName | eq |
| field:"TargetUserName" kind:eq |
src_ip | ne |
| field:"src_ip" kind:ne |