Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Computer Account With SPN

Status
production
Severity
medium
Group by
LogonId, dest, subject
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the addition of Service Principal Names (SPNs) HOST and RestrictedKrbHost to a computer account, indicative of KrbRelayUp behavior. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4741, to identify changes in SPNs. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Kerberos-based attacks, which can be used to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to impersonate services, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Credential AccessT1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets

Event coverage

Rule body splunk

name: Windows Computer Account With SPN
id: 9a3e57e7-33f4-470e-b25d-165baa6e8357
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-04-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the addition of Service Principal Names (SPNs) HOST and RestrictedKrbHost to a computer account, indicative of KrbRelayUp behavior. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4741, to identify changes in SPNs. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Kerberos-based attacks, which can be used to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to impersonate services, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4741
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4741 NewUacValue="0x80" ServicePrincipalNames IN ("*HOST/*","*RestrictedKrbHost/*")
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode),values(TargetDomainName),values(PrimaryGroupId), values(OldUacValue), values(NewUacValue),values(SamAccountName),values(DnsHostName),values(ServicePrincipalNames)
        BY dest Logon_ID subject
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_computer_account_with_spn_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4741 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: It is possible third party applications may add these SPNs to Computer Accounts, filtering may be needed.
references:
    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/an-attack-path-mapping-approach-to-cves-2021-42287-and-2021-42278
    - https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A Computer Account was created with SPNs related to Kerberos on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
    - Compromised Windows Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1558
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1558/windows_computer_account_with_spn/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4741 NewUacValue="0x80" ServicePrincipalNames IN ("*HOST/*","*RestrictedKrbHost/*")

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode),values(TargetDomainName),values(PrimaryGroupId), values(OldUacValue), values(NewUacValue),values(SamAccountName),values(DnsHostName),values(ServicePrincipalNames)
    BY dest Logon_ID subject

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_computer_account_with_spn_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 4741 corpus 2 (splunk 2)
NewUacValueeq
  • "0x80"
ServicePrincipalNamesin
  • "*HOST/*"
  • "*RestrictedKrbHost/*"