Detection rules › Splunk
Windows ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor Execution Via PowerShell Script
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging. The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments. This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain. When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process. This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant. Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Persistence | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Privilege Escalation | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Stealth | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Credential Access | T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access |
| Discovery | T1482 Domain Trust Discovery |
| Command & Control | T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | Event ID 4104 | Creating Scriptblock text (MessageNumber of MessageTotal). |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor Execution Via PowerShell Script
id: 59a8662f-f616-4494-8fa1-29ae77fc2018
version: 2
creation_date: '2026-05-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Raven Tait, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
This analytic detects the execution of the ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command via PowerShell Script Block Logging.
The ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor command is part of the AADInternals toolkit, which is used primarily for security testing and administrative tasks in Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) environments.
This particular command is designed to create a "backdoor" in a federated Azure AD domain.
When executed, ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor modifies the federation settings of a domain by adding or changing the federation configuration to allow an attacker to control the authentication process.
This manipulation enables the creation of security tokens that can impersonate any user within the Azure AD tenant.
Consequently, this allows an attacker to bypass Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), escalate privileges, and maintain persistent access to the Azure AD environment.
data_source:
- Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
`powershell`
EventID="4104"
ScriptBlockText="*ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor*"
| fillnull
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by Computer EventID ScriptBlockText signature signature_id user_id vendor_product Guid
Opcode Name Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
| rename Computer as dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_convertto_aadintbackdoor_execution_via_powershell_script_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Certain administrative or security testing activities in Azure AD environments may use ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor for legitimate federation configuration changes. Review and allow such actions from trusted administrators and approved tools.
references:
- https://atomicredteam.io/privilege-escalation/T1484.002/#atomic-test-1---add-federation-to-azure-ad
drilldown_searches:
- earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor Cmdlet execution via PowerShell script observed on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Azure Active Directory Persistence
- Azure Active Directory Account Takeover
- Azure Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1482
- T1078
- T1212
- T1071.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1482/snapattack/snapattack.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`powershell`
EventID="4104"
ScriptBlockText="*ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor*"
Stage 2: fillnull
| fillnull
Stage 3: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by Computer EventID ScriptBlockText signature signature_id user_id vendor_product Guid
Opcode Name Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
Stage 4: rename
| rename Computer as dest
Stage 5: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 6: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 7: search
| `windows_convertto_aadintbackdoor_execution_via_powershell_script_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
EventID | eq |
|
ScriptBlockText | eq |
|