Detection rules › Splunk

Windows Create Local Account

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
All_Changes.action, All_Changes.dest, All_Changes.result, All_Changes.user
Author
Michael Haag, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

Known false positives

  • It is possible that an administrator created the account. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised. Accounts created on Domain Controllers will trigger this too. Exclude if it becomes too noisy. This analytic is set to anomaly to allow for risk to be added. Filter and tune as needed. Restrict to critical infrastructure to reduce any volume.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Persistence

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

name: Windows Create Local Account
id: 3fb2e8e3-7bc0-4567-9722-c5ab9f8595eb
version: 13
creation_date: '2022-10-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4720
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Change where
    All_Changes.result_id=4720
    by All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result All_Changes.action
    | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `windows_create_local_account_filter`
how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs.  More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/'
known_false_positives: |
    It is possible that an administrator created the account. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
    Accounts created on Domain Controllers will trigger this too. Exclude if it becomes too noisy.
    This analytic is set to anomaly to allow for risk to be added. Filter and tune as needed.
    Restrict to critical infrastructure to reduce any volume.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: The following $user$ was added to $dest$ as a local account.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: The following $user$ was added to $dest$ as a local account.
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Password Spraying
    - CISA AA24-241A
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1136.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: tstats

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime
from datamodel=Change where
All_Changes.result_id=4720
by All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result All_Changes.action

Stage 2: search

| `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_create_local_account_filter`

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.