Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access
The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes attempting to access the Chrome extensions file. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior. This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit this file to extract sensitive information from the Chrome browser, posing a security risk. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to stored credentials and other sensitive data, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and broader network.
Known false positives
- The chrome uninstaller will access these set of files and folders. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Discovery |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4663: An attempt was made to access an object. |
Rule body
name: Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Extension Access
id: 2e65afe0-9a75-4487-bd87-ada9a9f1b9af
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-05-02'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes attempting to access the Chrome extensions file.
It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior.
This activity is significant because adversaries may exploit this file to extract sensitive information from the Chrome browser, posing a security risk.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to stored credentials and other sensitive data, potentially compromising the security of the affected system and broader network.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4663
search: |
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=4663
object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\*"
NOT process_path IN (
"*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Beta\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Dev\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome SxS\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Unstable\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe"
)
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by object_file_name object_file_path
process_name process_path
process_id EventCode dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663.
For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure."
known_false_positives: |-
The chrome uninstaller will access these set of files and folders. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 20
message: A non-chrome process $process_name$ accessing chrome browser extension folder files on $dest$
analytic_story:
- StealC Stealer
- DarkGate Malware
- Amadey
- Meduza Stealer
- Malicious Inno Setup Loader
- Phemedrone Stealer
- CISA AA23-347A
- RedLine Stealer
- Braodo Stealer
- MoonPeak
- 0bj3ctivity Stealer
- BlankGrabber Stealer
- Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1012
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security`
EventCode=4663
object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Local Extension Settings\\*"
NOT process_path IN (
"*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Beta\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Dev\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome SxS\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Unstable\\Application\\chrome.exe",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe"
)
Stage 2: stats
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
by object_file_name object_file_path
process_name process_path
process_id EventCode dest
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_extension_access_filter`
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
process_path | in | "*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Beta\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Dev\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome SxS\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Unstable\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe" | excludes:process_path |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4663" |
object_file_path | eq |
| field:"TargetFilename" kind:eq |