Detection rules › Splunk
Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME
The following analytic detects modifications to default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using the Group Policy Management Editor (GPME). It leverages the Endpoint data model to identify processes where mmc.exe executes gpme.msc with specific GUIDs related to default GPOs. This activity is significant because default GPOs, such as the Default Domain Controllers Policy and Default Domain Policy, are critical for enforcing security policies across the domain. If malicious, such modifications could allow an attacker to gain further access, establish persistence, or deploy malware across numerous hosts, severely compromising the network's security.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Privilege Escalation | T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
| Defense Impairment | T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
Rule body splunk
name: Windows Default Group Policy Object Modified with GPME
id: eaf688b3-bb8f-454d-b105-920a862cd8cb
version: 13
creation_date: '2023-04-24'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects modifications to default Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using the Group Policy Management Editor (GPME). It leverages the Endpoint data model to identify processes where `mmc.exe` executes `gpme.msc` with specific GUIDs related to default GPOs. This activity is significant because default GPOs, such as the `Default Domain Controllers Policy` and `Default Domain Policy`, are critical for enforcing security policies across the domain. If malicious, such modifications could allow an attacker to gain further access, establish persistence, or deploy malware across numerous hosts, severely compromising the network's security.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=mmc.exe (Processes.process =*gpme.msc*)
AND
(Processes.process = "*31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9*"
OR
Processes.process = "*6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9*" )
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: The default Group Policy Objects within an AD network may be legitimately updated for administrative operations, filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001
- https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/weaponizing-group-policy-objects-access/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/dn265969(v=ws.11)
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: A default group policy object was opened with Group Policy Manage Editor on $dest$
entity:
field: dest
type: system
score: 50
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
- Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1484.001
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1484.001/default_domain_policy_modified/windows-security.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: tstats
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
WHERE Processes.process_name=mmc.exe (Processes.process =*gpme.msc*)
AND
(Processes.process = "*31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9*"
OR
Processes.process = "*6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9*" )
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
Stage 2: search
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_default_group_policy_object_modified_with_gpme_filter`
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
Processes.process | eq |
|
Processes.process_name | eq |
|