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Detection rules › Splunk

Windows DNS Query Request by Telegram Bot API

Status
production
Severity
low
Group by
QueryName, QueryResults, QueryStatus, answer, answer_count, dvc, process_guid, process_name, query, query_count, reply_code_id, signature, signature_id, src, user_id, vendor_product
Author
Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
Source
github.com/splunk/security_content

The following analytic detects the execution of a DNS query by a process to the associated Telegram API domain, which could indicate access via a Telegram bot commonly used by malware for command and control (C2) communications. By monitoring DNS queries related to Telegram's infrastructure, the detection identifies potential attempts to establish covert communication channels between a compromised system and external malicious actors. This behavior is often observed in cyberattacks where Telegram bots are used to receive commands or exfiltrate data, making it a key indicator of suspicious or malicious activity within a network.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Command & ControlT1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS, T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 22DNSEvent (DNS query)

Rule body splunk

name: Windows DNS Query Request by Telegram Bot API
id: 86f66f44-94d9-412d-a71d-5d8ed0fef72e
version: 10
creation_date: '2021-08-03'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the execution of a DNS query by a process to the associated Telegram API domain, which could indicate access via a Telegram bot commonly used by malware for command and control (C2) communications. By monitoring DNS queries related to Telegram's infrastructure, the detection identifies potential attempts to establish covert communication channels between a compromised system and external malicious actors. This behavior is often observed in cyberattacks where Telegram bots are used to receive commands or exfiltrate data, making it a key indicator of suspicious or malicious activity within a network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 22
search: |-
    `sysmon` EventCode=22  query = "api.telegram.org" process_name != "telegram.exe"
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY answer answer_count dvc
           process_exec process_guid process_name
           query query_count reply_code_id
           signature signature_id src
           user_id vendor_product QueryName
           QueryResults QueryStatus
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_dns_query_request_by_telegram_bot_api_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and eventcode = 22 dnsquery executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
known_false_positives: a third part automation using telegram API.
references:
    - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-advisory-telegram-crypto-botnet-strt-ta01.html
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dvc
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: DNS query by a telegram bot [$query$] on [$dvc$].
analytic_story:
    - Crypto Stealer
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
    - VIP Keylogger
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1071.004
    - T1102.002
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: network
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1102.002/telegram_api_dns/telegram_dns.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: search

`sysmon` EventCode=22  query = "api.telegram.org" process_name != "telegram.exe"

Stage 2: stats

| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY answer answer_count dvc
       process_exec process_guid process_name
       query query_count reply_code_id
       signature signature_id src
       user_id vendor_product QueryName
       QueryResults QueryStatus

Stage 3: search

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Stage 4: search

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

Stage 5: search

| `windows_dns_query_request_by_telegram_bot_api_filter`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
EventCodeeq
  • 22 corpus 16 (splunk 16)
process_namene
  • "telegram.exe"
queryeq
  • "api.telegram.org" corpus 2 (sigma 1, splunk 1)