Detection rules › Splunk
Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added
The following analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Event ID 4732. This detection uses security event logs to identify changes to this high-privilege group. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.
Known false positives
- New members can be added to the DnsAdmins group as part of legitimate administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation |
Telemetry coverage
| Provider | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4732: A member was added to a security-enabled local group. |
Rule body
name: Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added
id: 27e600aa-77f8-4614-bc80-2662a67e2f48
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-03-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Event ID 4732. This detection uses security event logs to identify changes to this high-privilege group. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
- Windows Event Log Security 4732
search: |-
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=DnsAdmins
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetUserName) as target_users_added values(user) as user
BY dest src_user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_dnsadmins_new_member_added_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, Domain Controller events need to be ingested. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Security Group Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: New members can be added to the DnsAdmins group as part of legitimate administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/from-dnsadmins-to-system-to-domain-compromise
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-privilege-escalation-dnsadmins-to-domainadmin/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
finding:
title: A new member $user$ added to the DnsAdmins group by $src_user$
entity:
field: src_user
type: user
score: 50
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: search
`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=DnsAdmins
Stage 2: stats
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetUserName) as target_users_added values(user) as user
BY dest src_user
Stage 3: search
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
Stage 4: search
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Stage 5: search
| `windows_dnsadmins_new_member_added_filter`
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventCode | eq |
| field:"EventID" kind:eq value:"4732" |
TargetUserName | eq |
| field:"TargetUserName" kind:eq value:"DnsAdmins" |